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A The background for reforming the European Union 
emission trading system 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Greenhouse gas emissions globally 
Progress has been made in the doctrine of international environmental law. The Montreal Protocol, signed in 
1987, is an international environmental treaty that aimed to phase-out ozone-depleting substances by the year 
2000.1 Measurements show that the ozone layer is starting to recover.2 A similar success has been the collective 
effort to limit sulphur dioxide emissions in the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, signed 
in 1979.3 The global community has yet to witness comparable success with, for example, the greenhouse gas 
emission reductions and the loss of biodiversity.   
The Paris Agreement signed in 2015 under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), aims to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius and to pursue efforts to limit 
the warming even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius. To reach the 1.5 degrees Celsius target the emissions would 
have to reach net-zero around 2050; to reach 2 degrees, the emissions should reach net-zero around 2075.4  
The intention is that all nations will participate in the efforts to mitigate climate change and adapt to it. The 
Paris Agreement governs a vast range of issues, from climate finance to adaptation. One key feature of the 
agreement is the nationally determined contributions (NDC). Each party decides independently on the targets 
and measures to achieve the target and submits its NDC to the secretariat. The NDCs are revised every five years 
and with the presumption that the ambition level is increased every time. As the parties may decide on their 
own targets, the NDCs vary significantly. For example, the European Union (EU) is pledging to reduce its GHG 
emissions at least 40 per cent by 2030 compared to 1990, whereas Pakistan is merely stating that its emissions 
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will peak long after 2030 and that it intends to reduce 20 per cent of the projected emissions for 2030 depending 
on available grants and funds.5 Currently, the trajectory of combined NDCs does not fulfil the goals of the Paris 
Agreement. With the reductions provided in the NDCs, the pathway is towards 2.6 to 3.2 degrees Celsius 
warming by 2100.6 With roughly 40 gigatonnes (Gt) of annual greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), the remaining 
carbon budget of 900 Gt is likely to be exceeded in 22 years.7 Even with the reductions provided in the NDCs, 
warming of 2 degrees will be exceeded long before 2100. Even more rapid action is needed in order to limit 
global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius; the IPCC has estimated that the remaining carbon budget is somewhere 
between 420 Gt and 580 Gt.8 
1.2 Carbon pricing 
The goals of the Paris Agreement would be substantially easier to achieve, if nations could agree on a universal 
cap on annual emissions. Each entity could purchase a share of this cap. This would create a global unified 
carbon price formed by market forces, covering all actions that cause greenhouse gas emissions. The price would 
adjust to the scarcity of the global carbon budget.9 The market mechanism would guarantee that emission 
reduction targets are met in the most cost-efficient manner.  
This kind of approach is not likely to take place in the foreseeable future. The rules for the implementation of 
the Paris Agreement were scheduled to be approved at the 24th Conference of the Parties in Katowice, Poland, 
in December 2018. The parties could reach an agreement on most of the rules but were not able to agree on 
the rules relating to international carbon markets. Agreement on these rules was postponed to next year’s 
Conference of the Parties in Chile.10  
                                                           
5 Pakistan's NDC p. 27. 
6 Climate Action Tracker.  
7 MCC-Berlin. This is according to their most optimistic estimate of the remaining carbon budget. The other less optimistic scenarios 
are made for 720 Gt and 350 Gt of remaining emissions until exceeding two degrees Celsius.  
8 IPCC 2018. p.16. 
9 The amount of GHGs that is globally possible to emit in order to stay within the limits of a desired goal. 





Sectoral, global market-based mechanisms are possible; an example of a global market-based system is the 
aviation sector, which is scheduled to implement an offsetting scheme by 2021.11 If the system proves 
successful, it will provide a good model and make it easier for other sectors to follow suit.  
The overall trend is that a greater share of emissions will be covered by some form of carbon pricing. Currently 
approximately 15 per cent of greenhouse gases are covered by an emission trading system (ETS).12 As new 
jurisdictions implement ETSs and existing ETSs are expanded to cover more sectors, the likelihood of the 
establishment of a global carbon market increases.  
However, if no universal top-down climate policies are adopted or if the ambition level of the current bottom-
up policies does not rise, the future is more ambiguous. The economic growth, population growth and rising 
living standards will stretch the boundaries that planet earth can sustain. In the International Energy Agency's 
World Energy Outlook Current Policies Scenario (IEA CP) the world's primary demand for energy will increase 
from 13 billion tonnes of oil equivalent (Btoe) in 2016 to 19 Btoe in 2040.13 In 2050 coal will still be an 
economically feasible option in many parts of the world where it is found in significant quantities and the labour 
costs are low.14 In 2017 global energy-related greenhouse gas emissions reached an all-time high at 32.5 Gt of 
carbon dioxide. The emissions are expected to increase in the coming years. In the IEA CP, we are on the track 
to 42.7 Gt of energy-related emissions annually in 2040.15 
Regardless of the depressing overall picture, a lot of positive developments are in the pipeline. Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance estimates that with the current policies, 48 per cent of electricity will be produced by solar and 
wind by 2050.16 In Europe the share of renewable energy sources (RES) is forecasted to reach 87 per cent by 
2050. The shrinking cost of storage batteries will help RES to overcome the problem of intermittency. This 
development, accompanied with the decreasing share of coal used in electricity generation, will in itself reduce 
emissions. Even though the levelized cost of energy for wind and solar is dropping dramatically, it will not alone 
be enough to decarbonize the current system and answer to the increasing demand for energy. This could be 
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12 ICAP 2018. p.1. 
13 IEA 2017. p.79. 
14 BNEF NEO 2018. 
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interpreted as a sign that an increasing share of decarbonization is market-based without government's 
intervention. 
The aforementioned data is part of the bigger global story. This thesis focuses on the emissions related to the 
ETS sector in the EU. It is important to bear in mind that these are not the only sources of emissions and it is 
more difficult to decarbonize other sectors. Government' intervention is necessary, because even if the world 
were to eventually decarbonize by itself, it cannot happen fast enough to avoid the detrimental effects of 
climate change. In the energy sector, climate policies are needed for facilitating the change and for ensuring 
that it does happen fast enough.  
Europe's share of global energy-related emissions is roughly ten per cent and will further shrink to six per cent 
in 2050.17 The EU ETS currently represents circa 45 per cent of the EU's GHG emissions. Assuming that the ETS's 
scope is not expanded, the EU ETS's share of global emissions will shrink somewhere between 0 to 3 per cent of 
global GHGs in 2050.18  
These figures show that even a complete reform of the EU ETS would not be enough to achieve the Paris 
Agreement's targets. Notwithstanding the minor impact on the absolute amount of emissions, increasing the 
ambition level of the EU ETS will incentivize low-carbon innovations. If these innovations can be scaled globally, 
the cost of new technologies will decrease everywhere and will have an enormous impact on global GHG 
emissions. Moreover, in some parts of the EU the energy transition is not self-evident: for example, 80 per cent 
of Poland's electricity is produced with coal. Even Germany gets 40 per cent of its electricity from coal.19 If the 
EU's electricity system could phase out the use of coal and eventually gas-fired power production while having 
moderate electricity prices, low price volatility and security of supply, this successful transition could act as a 
model for other jurisdictions. The EU's increased targets will encourage other countries to raise their ambition 
levels and the EU will have an important role in this transition: leading by example and providing finance and 
policy models for other regions. 
                                                           
17 The EU's energy-related emissions were around 3.4 Gt in 2017. 
18 This is due the fact that the EU ETS is one of the most ambitious policies in the world. Presuming that the ETS sector's targets will 
remain the most ambitious, its share will shrink comparable to other sectors that reduce emissions, but at a slower rate. This figure is 
not an exact calculation; the intention is to provide context. 
19 ICIS Germany's coal phase-out report. Lignite accounted for 24.2% (134.0 TWh) of Germany’s power production in 2017, while hard 





1.3 The theme of research and main research questions 
The current EU ETS has not produced a high enough price for greenhouse gas emissions. This is why some 
stakeholders have proposed a carbon price floor that would guarantee a certain minimum price for greenhouse 
gas emissions. A carbon price floor (CPF) means modifying an emission trading system by implementing an 
instrument that puts a minimum price for emitting a tonne of carbon dioxide, in contrast with the price that is 
determined by supply and demand of allowances in an emission trading system. A CPF can be implemented by 
placing a tax on top of the allowance price as has been done in the UK or by imposing a minimum price in the 
auctions as has been done in California.  
The purpose of this thesis is to outline the legal preconditions for establishing a carbon price floor. The focus is 
especially on the limitations and conditions that derive from EU-legislation. This is because energy and 
environmental legislation is in the shared competence of EU and its member states meaning that both of them 
have powers to regulate this policy areas. In the EU, the possible introduction of a carbon price floor has been 
debated among a few member states, and various stakeholders have expressed their support or opposition 
towards this measure. In most cases, these proposals have lacked substance on the possible implementation 
model, governance and the legal feasibility. In order to answer how the carbon price floor would be possible in 
the EU, following three main questions need to be answered: 
First, what is the correct legislative procedure for implementing an EU-wide carbon price floor?  This is studied 
in the context of the UK model and then the same assessment is done regarding the California model. The 
legislative procedure can mean either qualified majority or unanimity in the Council of the European Union.  
Implementing the CPF EU-wide can prove to be politically difficult. The second question is, can the carbon price 
floor be implemented regionally and what are the boundaries from EU legislation’s perspective? This question 
is answered by studying what is the scope of a member state's legislative competence in the field of 
environmental legislation. After the competence question is answered, the implementation of the regional 
carbon price floor is considered by studying different intergovernmental treaties and their assets and liabilities. 





The CPF implemented regionally is not as stable as an EU instrument. Therefore, a rarely used and more 
permanent and binding regional structure, enhanced cooperation is studied. The third research question is can 
the carbon price floor be implemented by using enhanced cooperation? 
Because the establishment of a CPF within the EU or regionally is a hypothetical reform that may take place in 
the future, definitive conclusions cannot be drawn. The main aim of the study is to provide guidelines on which 
options are legally possible and which are not and to distinguish areas where the legality is uncertain and 
requires further assessment.  
1.4 Research methods and materials 
This thesis is a legal dogmatic research and all of the three main questions are of legal dogmatic nature. The 
knowledge interest of the thesis is mainly legislation and legal decision making.20 This thesis studies the EU 
primary legislation related to environment and the division of powers between EU and the member states in 
order to find the legal preconditions for setting a carbon price floor. Furthermore, this thesis provides 
recommendations on the possible interpretation of the law by studying the legality of legislative reforms 
suggested in public discussion. The thesis argues why certain legislative reforms would be compatible with the 
EU-legislation and under what conditions. This thesis is providing de lege lata arguments on the application of 
the law and de lege ferenda agruments concretizing different solutions presented by various stakeholders in 
practical implementation models.  
Besides legal dogmatic research this thesis utilises a comparative method. Comparative assessments are done, 
because they offer practical implementation models and provide answers how the legal preconditions for 
setting a carbon price floor have been dealt with in other jurisdictions. Governments try to learn from each 
other when designing ETSs. The phenomenon where a law or an institution is copied from one jurisdiction and 
implemented is called legal transplant.21 The different carbon price floor models have been earlier implemented 
in other jurisdictions. Modifying the EU ETS by implementing a carbon price floor which is inspired by the 
California’s or the UK’s model is a type of legal transplant. The systems that will be primarily used for comparison 
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are the California' ETS and the UK's national taxation related to the EU ETS.  Other systems differ more broadly 
from the EU ETS and are therefore left out of the study. Carbon price floor arrangements were scheduled in the 
Australian ETS and the United States (US) federal ETS but were never implemented and therefore are not as 
good reference as the existing systems.  
Some nonlegal evaluation has to be done due to the nature of the EU-norms that are studied, their 
interpretation requires evaluating issues beyond purely legal positivist notions. For example, the question 
whether a norm is furthering the EU's integration process or undermining the social cohesion is very abstract, 
especially in the absence of previous case law. These considerations take the research further to social sciences 
and economic analysis. Furthermore, as these are fundamental questions of the EU's integration, the normative 
choices are influenced by the values of whoever is interpreting the treaty Articles. This means that an 
interdisciplinary approach is needed for the proper assessment of the policy options. In this thesis, an 
elementary economic assessment of the policies is conducted by referring to other studies where the effects of 
carbon price floor have been studied. This is due to the fact, that it is a question of a hypothetical future reform, 
only speculations can be made about the actual implementation model. The space constraints do not allow a 
further study of this aspect.  
The EU legislation is the most important material for this thesis. The area of the emphasized CPF is already 
governed by the EU legislation to some extent. The main pieces of primary legislation studied are Articles 191 
to 193, 4, and 326 to 334 of the treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) concerning the 
environment, and Article 20 of the treaty on European Union (TEU).  
The EU treaties govern the competence of the EU, the competence of the member states and the relation 
between these two. Article 4 of the TFEU lists policy areas that are in the shared competence between the EU 
and the member states. This division of powers is studied to provide understanding of what aspects of emissions 
trading member states can regulate and what is solely in the EU's competence. Articles 191 to 193 of the TFEU 
are assessed in order to understand what the correct procedure is for implementing the carbon price floor in 
the EU. Article 20 of the treaty on European Union sets a provision that provides the basis for enhanced 





European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law is vital for construing the normative content of the generic and abstract 
primary legislation.22  
Research in the field of EU law is highly affected by the rulings of the ECJ. As the institution which, in most cases 
has the final word on the content of EU law, this authority is understandable. But if the ECJ is the only recognized 
authority, the thesis can be too highly dependent on the previous cases and ultimately opinions of few people. 
This study aims to be mindful of the context and interpret material from multiple sources. Environmental 
regulation forms a large part of the material used in this thesis. Environmental regulation reacts to the actions 
of natural and legal persons, either by preventing destruction of the environment or by retrospectively reacting 
to environmental loss that has already happened.23 Environmental policies can range from binding laws to 
guidelines and self-regulation by companies. The scope of environmental regulation, especially in climate law, 
often goes beyond national laws. It is worth noting that environmental regulation is based on the results of 
other sciences. Emission trading schemes and environmental governance in general are based on the extensive 
research done by biologists, climatologists, meteorologists and scientists from other fields. It is only with the 
understanding of what their contribution has brought us that 1) we know about global warming and its 
devastating effects; and 2) we can use that scientific research to calculate the level of greenhouse gas mitigation 
needed to avoid the worst-case scenario. It could be said that the foundation of environmental law is set by 
science.  
California's state legislation and the UK's CPF-related legislation and case law are the most important material 
from foreign jurisdictions.24 International treaties, such as the Paris Agreement and the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, are used as examples of how an international hard law instrument could be used as a 
method of agreeing on the CPF and what would be the assets and liabilities of different agreements. The 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) are examples of a legal 
instrument that governments can utilize for agreeing on common policy schemes. These examples provide an 
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23 Kokko 2016. 30. 
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example of a non-hard law agreement governance model which could be utilized to set up the followed when 
the treaty outside EU's competence is studied. 
1.5 The structure of the thesis 
This study is divided into four main parts. The part A provides background information to the EU ETS and to the 
debate around reforming it. Chapter 1 consists of a general introduction to the latest developments in climate 
policy and puts the study in context. Further it presents the research questions, methods and materials. Chapter 
2 goes more into details on the EU's different climate policy instruments and studies the economics behind 
emission trading and carbon taxation. In chapter 3, the current EU's emission trading legislation and its history 
is presented.  
Part B explains what the carbon price floor is and assesses the legal preconditions of implementing an EU-wide 
carbon price floor. Chapter 4 presents two different models how the carbon price floor has been built in other 
ETSs: an auction reserve price in California and a carbon support rate in the UK. Chapter 5 studies legal 
arguments whether the EU-wide CPF should be implemented using a qualified majority or unanimity in the 
Council of the European Union.  
Part C develops the ideas presented in part B further by starting from a premise that EU-wide carbon price floor 
proves impossible to be implemented. The same two CPF models that were presented earlier are now studied 
in a regional sub EU-context. Chapter 6 assesses the competence of a single member state to implement the 
CPF and compares different types of international agreements that could be utilized for implementing the CPF 
regionally. Chapter 7 studies the possibility of implementing the CPF with enhanced cooperation. Enhanced 
cooperation is a procedure where a group of member states uses the EU-institutions to implement legislation 
on a policy area where agreement cannot be reached at the EU-level.  
Part D represents the conclusions of the thesis. Chapter 9 sums up the thesis and presents the most important 
findings. Furthermore, it shortly presents authors ideas for further research.  
Whether the implementation of carbon price floor is beneficial to society is left for other venues to discuss. This 





should be implemented or not, the environmental, economic and societal aspects would have to be studied and 
measured against each other. This would require an extensive research going far beyond the scope of a legal 
study. 
 
2 The European Union’s climate policy 
2.1 European Union’s long-term targets  
In this chapter the European Union’s climate policy framework is explained. The EU ETS is part of a larger climate 
policy package that is implemented to reach the EU's targets for GHG emission reduction. The European Union 
implements its climate policies as holistic packages, covering a wide range of economic activities. Currently, the 
EU has put in place targets for 2020, 2030 and 2050. The 2020 and 2030 targets are accompanied by a larger 
legislative package. The 2050 Roadmap from 2011 includes milestone targets; a 40 per cent reduction by the 
year 2030 and a 60 per cent reduction by the year 2040. The roadmap for transforming the EU into a competitive 
low-carbon economy by 2050 (Low-carbon 2050) sets the EU's long-term emission reduction targets and the 
strategy on how to get there. Low-carbon 2050 is drafted by Commission's Directorate-General for Climate 
Action (DG-clima) along with similar initiatives from other Commission's directorates (e.g. 2050 Energy Roadmap 
and the Transport White Paper) envision the strategy to decarbonize Europe in a cost-effective manner.  
These high-level strategies affect the EU ETS as well, because they cover a substantial amount of the EU's GHG 
emissions; if the ambition of emission reductions is raised, the ETS needs to be modified to correspond with the 
new targets. Currently, the European Union is in the process of developing a strategy for long-term EU 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions, relating to this the EU released a document called A Clean Planet for all 
in November 2018.25 The packages are more political in nature and they are not implemented using EU’s 
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legislative instruments. However, the sector specific legislation that is used to enforce these targets can be 
legally binding e.g. EU ETS directive. 
2.2 The 2020 climate and energy package 
The 2020 energy and climate package obliges the EU to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 20 per cent by 2020 
compared to the 1990 levels, increase the share of renewable energy to 20 per cent in the energy consumption 
and improve energy efficiency by 20 per cent. The GHG emission reduction target and the goal to increase the 
share of renewables are binding, while the energy efficiency target is not legally obligating.26 The package was 
formed from six legislative measures that would implement these targets. Regarding emission reductions, a 
larger reduction is expected from the ETS sector, than from the non-ETS sector, due to the fact that it is more 
cost-efficient to reduce emissions in these sectors.27 The burden of non-ETS reductions is not uniform across 
member states, and several member states are even allowed to increase their emissions during this period of 
time. The individual targets for each member state are set out in the effort-sharing decision.28 
2.3 The 2030 Framework for climate and energy  
The European Union has set an overall binding target of a 40 per cent emission reduction by 2030 compared to 
1990. To achieve this, the sectoral goal for the ETS is a 43 per cent reduction compared to 2005.29 The GHG 
emission reduction target is accompanied by a target share of 27 per cent renewable energy consumption and 
a target of 27 per cent energy efficiency. These targets were agreed in 2014 in the 2030 Framework for climate 
and energy.30 The targets were concretized in the Clean Energy For All Europeans package in 2016.  Currently, 
the EU is in the process of putting these targets into legislation and has agreed to increase the ambition level. 
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28 Decision No 406/2009/EC. Recently the effort-sharing decision was continued post-2020 with Regulation (EU) 2018/842. 
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For RES, the target will be 32 per cent and for energy efficiency the target is 32.5 per cent. Both of the 
abovementioned Directives have been recently approved by the Parliament and the Council.31 
2.4 The 2050 roadmaps 
In 2011 the European Commission published a Low-Carbon Roadmap and the 2050 Energy Roadmap that stated 
that the GHG emissions should be cut by 80-95 per cent compared to 1990 by the year 2050. The Energy 
Roadmap (ER) acknowledges the importance of the 2020 targets, but it also realizes that these targets will not 
be enough to decarbonize European Union.32  
The ER presents different scenarios with variables such as the energy mix, energy efficiency, electrification and 
new technologies, e.g., carbon capture and storage (CCS). In all scenarios the share of renewable energy (RES) 
will rise significantly and to at least 55 per cent of the final energy consumption.33 Another trend that is shown 
in the scenarios is the increasing electrification of society. Hence, many sectors of society e.g. transportation, 
heating and cooling, will be increasingly powered by electricity, which in turn leads to a growing demand for 
electricity, even if energy efficiency increases significantly. Decarbonization with electrification, however, only 
makes sense if the electricity originates from low-carbon energy sources.  
There are a lot of open questions that affect the sum of this equation: Will CCS technology become commercially 
viable? And, what is the role of nuclear power?34 Regardless of the energy transformation, conventional means 
of energy generation are still required; in the diversified energy supply scenario, the role of natural gas in power 
production will remain important.35 One possible threat from the increasing renewables is that the very low 
marginal cost of renewables will drive the electricity price down, which creates a situation where the backup 
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including a review clause by 2023 for an upward revision of the EU level target. 
32EC Energy Roadmap 2050, 2011. p. 1. States that the 2020 targets will continue to reduce GHG emissions beyond their scope, but 
continuing with this pathway will accomplish only a 40 per cent reduction by 2050. 
33 Ibid. p. 8.  
34 Ibid. p. 8-10. 





power operators cannot operate profitably.36 The report addresses this issue by calling for policies that ensure 
electricity generation is secured at all times.  
The roadmap for transforming the EU into a competitive low-carbon economy by 2050 assesses mitigation 
economy-wide and includes sectors, such as agriculture, that are not covered in the Energy Roadmap. The Low-
Carbon Roadmap should be used as a basis for sectoral and more specific strategies.37 However, as energy has 
a pivotal role in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, the Energy Roadmap and Low-Carbon 2050 are 
overlapping in many areas. 
The Commission presented a new 2050 vision for Europe in November 2018. The document called A Clean Planet 
for all, A European strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral 
economy aims in achieving climate neutrality by 2050. The new A Clean Planet for all vision presents scenarios 
and pathways in which the EU achieves varying levels of decarbonisation by 2050. The document does not aim 
to set binding targets or new obligations.38 The effect that the renewed vision will have on EU’s current climate 
regulation will be seen in the coming years. 
3 The European Union emission trading system 
3.1 Basic elements of European Union emission trading system 
In chapter three the economic rationale behind emission trading and the history of the EU ETS is described. A 
special focus is on the reforms that were aimed at improving the functioning of price discovery in the EU ETS.  
The basic elements of the EU Emission Trading System are defined in the Emission Trading Directive, which has 
been implemented in national laws.39 The list of industries covered by the EU ETS has been amended by changes 
to the Directive.   
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The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade based ETS, meaning that the European Commission sets an annually decreasing 
cap. The cap constitutes allowances that are auctioned or allocated for free during the year.40 The EU ETS has 
evolved more towards auctioning and away from free allocation.41 The EU used to base the free allocation on a 
method called grandfathering, in which allowances were given to businesses based on their historical emission 
levels. This method had its problems, e.g. it was more profitable for the backup power generators not to produce 
energy, and to instead sell the received European Union Allowances (EUAs), because by generating electricity 
they would have emitted GHGs and would have had to surrender an equal amount of tradable allowances.42 
Since 2013, the EU has used benchmarking and auctioning as a method of allocation.43 
Undertakings with compliance obligation are required to obtain a GHG emission permit.44 Furthermore, the 
aforementioned undertakings are required to submit an amount of -allowances corresponding to their verified 
emissions by April 30th each year. The level of emissions has to be verified for the system to be reliable. In the 
EU ETS this is done by a competent outsider.45It is worthy to note, that after receiving the allowance, the entity 
                                                           
40 The revenue from these auctions is received by the members states according to their share of allowances, which is largely based 
on the emissions during the first phase. Directive 2003/87/EC, Article 3d emphasizes that the auctioning revenues should be used to 
tackle climate change. 
41 An undertaking can receive an allowance either by free allocation, by purchasing it from an auction, receiving it from the new 
entrance reserve or by acquiring it from a private party that is willing to sell the allowance (secondary market). 
42 In economic terms this phenomenon is called windfall profit.  
43 Benchmarking is an allocation method that bases the allocation on an efficiency standard. Entities will receive allowances based on 
average emissions per ton of the most efficient ten per cent of installations. 
44 The ETS directive lists industries, in which entities are obliged to submit a permit e.g. electricity generation, EU’s internal aviation 
and cement and steel production. The permit required by the ETS Directive is common with the permit required by Directive 96/61/EC. 
In Article 26 of the ETS Directive, the application of Directive 96/61/EC is limited relating to overlapping with emission trading; the 
permit will not include an emission value limit if the installation is subject to the ETS. Article 26 does not mention taxation or any other 
form of policy other than efficiency standards, and therefore the application is deemed to be limited to only these efficiency policies. 
Furthermore, Article 193 of the Lisbon Treaty guarantees that the regulations will not prevent national governments from taking more 
stringent approaches as long as these approaches are in compliance with the treaties and are notified to the Commission.  However, 
there are some exceptions to this rule. For example, the permit required by the Finnish Environmental Protection Act can set limits to 
emissions if there is a risk of significant degradation of the environment, even if the installation is subject to the ETS. See more Finnish 
Environmental Protection Act, Section 55 and Peeters - Uylenburg 2014.  
45 In Finland the emission permit is registered in a system called FINETS (www.paastolupa.fi). The emission permit and the register are 
not linked to the EU register and it is for the purpose of measuring the actualized emissions. The emission permits are granted for 
each installation separately. The verifiers are private operators that act as officials whilst verifying the emissions. In the yearly report, 
the emissions have to be calculated for each fuel separately, and changes in fuel usage and machinery are reported to the authority. 





does not necessarily need to surrender it; it can sell it to the market, voluntarily cancel it or bank (save) it for 
future use.46   
Participation in the auctions is open to entities that are eligible to apply for an admission to bid.47 These include 
entities with compliance obligation, investment firms, credit institutions and public bodies. Participation in the 
secondary market is not limited; any natural or legal person can buy allowances from the secondary market, the 
only prerequisite being an account in the Union Registry.48 
3.2 The economic rationale behind an emission trading system 
When governments, states and international organizations are defining their environmental policies, they have 
a range of options to choose from: they can use command and control regulation, voluntary contracts that 
encourage environmentally friendly behaviour or just persuade environmentally friendly behaviour, or 
economic steering mechanisms that internalize the environmental externalities.49 All these instruments have 
their advantages and disadvantages and each of them can be used for different purposes. However, the 
uncoordinated combination of policy instruments and overlapping policies may result in sub-optimized solutions 
from the point of view of cost-efficiency, make investments riskier, complicate decision making and cause a 
waterbed effect.50  
The rationale behind economic steering is found in the principles of the market economy. Accordingly, only in 
rare cases should a contract between private parties be prohibited, because the prohibition of this contract 
leads to a welfare loss.51 Command and control regulation that prohibits the use of fossil fuels tends to be a 
more expensive and more inflexible way to mitigate climate change than economic steering. By setting price 
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47 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010. Article 18.  
48 Hollo 2011. p. 212.  
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signals, economic steering guides the demand towards low-carbon technology and creates a situation where 
only an entity that has to use fossil fuels can afford to do so.52  
Economic steering, such as ETS or a pollution tax (e.g. carbon tax), is optimal to be used when emissions are 
measurable, there is a need to reduce pollution but not to ban the polluting activity completely, and it does not 
matter which installation reduces the emissions.53 The aforementioned conditions are in place for greenhouse 
gas emissions, albeit in an optimal situation the economic steering mode used to combat GHGs would be 
global.54 
From an economic point of view, this debate can be traced back to Arthur Pigou's and Ronald Coase's discussion 
on externalities and how we should solve them.55 According to Pigou, society should put a price on the harmful 
activity that is equal to the cost on society. Contrary to Pigou, who wanted to limit the harmful activities, Coase 
argued that the right to cause environmental harm is a commodity and the most efficient way to use it 
sustainably is by a market mechanism.56  
This debate has continued and actualized in politics over a discussion whether to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions with emission trading or with a carbon tax.57 Both of these policy options have their benefits, and the 
tradeoff is between certainty about prices and certainty about emissions. Under a carbon tax, there is certainty 
over what is the price of emitting; reciprocally, an emission trading system provides a certainty on the level of 
emission reductions and reaching the agreed target. Combining these instruments to hybrid policies makes it 
possible to ease the choice between cost certainty and emission reduction certainty. A carbon price floor or a 
price collar is an implication of this policy.58 Purely quantity-based instruments, such as emission trading, are 
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subject to uncertainty about prices. Contrarily, purely price-based instruments, such as carbon tax, are subject 
to uncertainty on emission reductions, i.e. the environmental goal. 
One way to systemize different ETSs is to categorize them into cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit systems. 
The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system. A Cap-and-trade system has a cap, which is the total amount of allowances 
allocated in the trading period. The method of allocation varies between free allocation and the auctioning of 
allowances. Each participant is obliged to surrender an amount of allowances equal to their emissions at the 
end of the respective trading period. The needed amount can be reached either by trading allowances or by 
reducing emissions. A key element in an ETS is the sanction fee, which is applied in case of non-compliance. The 
fee in the EU ETS is currently 100 euros per allowance that should have been submitted.  
A baseline-and-credit model, such as the United Nation's Kyoto Protocol's Joint implementation and Clean 
Development Mechanism, create a market for emission reduction projects. The amount of credits is calculated 
by comparing the reduction to the baseline. The credits obtained from these projects can then be sold or used 
for compliance purposes.  
The idea of the European Union's Emission Trading System and ETSs in general is that emission reductions 
happen where mitigation is most cost-efficient. Because the cost of emission reduction is different between 
installations, there is an incentive for every entity to participate in emission trading.59 Those undertakings that 
can reduce emissions at a relatively low-cost can either sell their excess allowances or they can to purchase 
fewer allowances. ETS benefits also those who cannot reduce emissions without high costs incurring, because 
they can acquire allowances from entities that are able to reduce emissions at lower costs. The greatest cost-
efficiency is found where the marginal cost of reducing carbon dioxide is the lowest.60  When optimally 
functioning, an emission trading system, promotes investments towards low-carbon technologies by giving price 
signals to entities that are considering investments. The higher the allowance price is, the more competitive the 
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low-carbon technologies become.61 Ideally, the opportunity cost to reduce the emissions is lower than the cost 
to acquire the needed allowances.62  
Another key element of the EU ETS is to incentivize low-carbon investments in order to decarbonize the 
European economy in the longer term. While this aim is considerably overlapping with the purpose of reducing 
emissions, there is a slight difference. To ensure that investing in new technologies is profitable, the price 
trajectory needs to be steadily rising. If there is no certainty that the EU ETS will deliver a high enough price that 
low-carbon technologies are able to compete with traditional solutions in the long-term, the entities might not 
be willing to make risky investments in new technologies. Regardless of the price development of EUAs, 
emission reductions are inevitable, because the cap is tightening. However, expensive and risky investments 
into new technologies that are not necessarily commercially viable are not guaranteed, unless the long-term 
price signals are high enough.63 This subject can be traced back to a broader debate concerning the purpose of 
ETS: is it to limit GHG emissions or to put a price on pollution.64 The relevance of this debate can be questioned: 
when the ETS is functioning properly, it puts limit on the amount of GHG emissions that can be released to the 
atmosphere by the entities with a compliance obligation, whilst simultaneously this limit creates an artificial 
scarcity of allowance supply, which hikes up the price. In the event that the ETS is not achieving the envisioned 
price level, the regulator can interfere by limiting the supply that creates more scarcity or can manage the price 
by setting minimum or maximum prices to the auctions.65  
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3.3 The history of the European Union Emission Trading System 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, an international framework for climate change mitigation started to form; the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 and the agreement on the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was reached in 1992.66 The UNFCCC established 
the regime for reporting and cooperating in climate change mitigation and it can be seen as a model for how to 
do climate agreements. Regardless of the growing interest towards climate change mitigation, no action was 
taken, or binding regulation enacted until the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol.  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is an international body, governed by the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which reviews 
and assesses research about climate change. The goal of the IPCC is to give neutral and fact-based information 
about climate change.67  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was agreed in 1992, with a compromise result 
that sets a "common but differentiated responsibility". The Convention has common responsibilities for all of 
the countries and individual responsibilities for countries listed in Annex I of the agreement. The UNFCCC meets 
annually in the Conference of the Parties (COP).68  
In 1990 the EU set a target of stabilizing the emissions to the 1990 level by the year 2000. This target was 
accomplished, in fairness not solely because of the EU’s policies, but with the help of the downturn in the 
economy.69  
The EU continued the climate change mitigation and the 1997 burden-sharing agreement set varying individual 
targets for member states. Notwithstanding, this agreement had to be revised later that year due to new 
emission reduction targets when Kyoto Protocol was agreed.  
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The Kyoto Protocol (KP) is a part of the UNFCCC, but it is only applicable to those countries that have ratified it. 
The KP sets individual GHG emission reduction targets for the UNFCCC Annex 1 countries.70 The assigned amount 
for each country is calculated by first multiplying the 1990 emissions by five and then subtracting the target 
reduction from this amount.71  
The idea of emission trading came from the United States. The first commenced ETS was the 1995 sulphur 
dioxide ETS in the United States. This programme introduced two yet unknown features in the environmental 
regulation regime: an annual cap on emissions and the possibility to trade received allowances with other 
participants.72 Later on, emission trading was brought to the global agenda with the introduction of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997, under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Kyoto 
Protocol was a logical continuation to the European Union’s climate policy as it had a similar setup with the 
burden-sharing agreement, individual GHG emission reduction targets for countries based on what is feasible 
regarding the level of development and emission levels. The Kyoto Protocol introduced flexibility mechanisms 
in order to ease the process of meeting these targets: Emission Trading, Clean Development Mechanism and 
Joint Implementation. 73 At first the European Union was sceptical about Emission Trading and tried to promote 
other means of mitigation but ended-up endorsing the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanism and implementing 
emission trading as the underlying method of climate policy.74  
The European Commission’s proposal for a Directive in 1992, which would have put forward a Community wide 
carbon energy tax in the form a levy imposed on the carbon content of a fossil fuel, faced resistance and the 
Council could not agree on it. Hence Article 157 of the treaty establishing the European Community would have 
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required unanimous agreement to pass the Directive.75 The Commission ended up withdrawing the proposal 
due to resistance from member states and industries.76  
In 2000 the European Commission presented a green paper that envisioned the idea of ETS as a replacement 
for the failed carbon tax. The green paper later led the Commission to adopt the ETS directive.  
The European Union Emission Trading System is built on the foundation set by the treaty of Rome in 1957 and 
its revision, the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. The SEA was an act that amended the European Union’s 
internal market to include new areas, for example environmental issues. This alteration to the European Union’s 
internal market enabled the introduction of an emission trading system. When the Emission Trading Directive 
was passed, The treaty of Rome was called The treaty establishing the European Community.77 The treaty 
establishing the European Community has been renamed again and contemporarily it is The treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.78 
The EU Emission Trading Directive 2003/87/EC commenced carbon trading in the European Union with a pilot 
phase from 2005-2007. The EU ETS is phased and designed in a way that the reformations should take place at 
the beginning of a trading period. The trend in reforming the EU ETS has been towards more auctioning, a more 
stringent cap, from national allocation plans (NAPs) to one EU-wide cap and the method of allocating allowances 
for free has changed from grandfathering to EU-wide benchmarking. 
3.4 The first and the second phase of the EU ETS 
The aim of the first phase (2005-2007) of the EU ETS was to prepare for the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment 
period 2008-2012 and to familiarize participants with the ETS. The pilot phase included only the power sector, 
the production and processing of ferrous metals, the mineral industry, and pulp and paper production.79 In the 
first phase, the system only covered carbon dioxide emissions. In the second phase reforms, the EU ETS was 
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amended to cover more GHGs.80 During the first phase, the allocation of allowances was left to member states, 
which had to draft the national allocation plans (NAP). The NAP defined, how the allowances would be allocated, 
how many EUAs each entity would receive and what percentage of allowances would be auctioned. The member 
states wanted to protect their industries and allocated generously in their NAPs. Subsequently, this lead to over 
allocation of allowances and plunging EUA prices, in spite of the Commission's request for modifications of 
fourteen of twenty-five NAPs.81 The struggles in the first phase of the EU ETS later led to a more stringent control 
of the NAPs by the Commission. The allocation was at the discretion of the member states, but this competence 
was subject to limits that the Directive set for the NAPs. After the member states drafted the NAPs, they were 
sent to the Commission, which could propose changes. Based on these suggestions, the member states made 
the final NAP.82  
3.5 The third phase of EU ETS 
The 2009/29/EC ETS Directive was enacted as a part of “climate and energy package” that was executed in order 
to ensure, that the targets of the 20-20-20 by 2020 package would be achieved.83 The new Directive, which 
entered into force in 2013, amended and reformed the EU ETS in various ways, such as:84 It increased the 
amount of allowances that would be auctioned and changed the method of pursuing free allocation and 
replaced the NAPs with an EU-wide cap. The new directive included more sectors and more greenhouse gas 
emissions in the ETS. Furthermore, it lengthened the upcoming phases and introduced the linear reduction 
factor (LRF). 
This meant that the EU ETS would become more like the US centralized system, where the cap was decided top-
down by a central authority. The LRF, meaning the rate at which the overall cap is reduced annually, was set at 
1.74 per cent per year, in order to reach a 21 per cent reduction of GHG emissions below 2005 levels by the year 
2020.85 The power sector faced a drastic change starting in 2013 when it was required to purchase all its 
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allowances; this transformation is done gradually in other industries.86 The overall percentage of allowances 
auctioned climbed from less than four per cent during the second phase, to more than fifty per cent.87 Articles 
10a and 10c of the Directive set three different methods of allocation that range according to the activity. The 
ETS Directive was amended to cover new industries, like petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium. 
Furthermore, the length of the phases was changed from five years to eight years.88 
The reforms in the third phase were not limited to the aforementioned changes. Before enacting the legislation 
for the third phase, the European Union legislature adopted Directive 2008/101, which included aviation in the 
EU ETS. Airline operators have to surrender emission permits for their emissions during all flights landing or 
taking off from an airport situated within the European Economic Area (EEA).89 However, flights taking off or 
landing outside the EEA are temporarily excluded, and inclusion back into the system has not been scheduled.90 
This inclusion caused controversy amongst the international aviation community, and the regulation was 
challenged in the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Queen’s Bench Division, that asked for advice on 
interpretation of the EU legislation. The Court of Justice stated that the inclusion of aviation is compatible with 
international law.91  
Sinking prices fuelled the Commission's fear that participants would lose faith in the EU ETS and therefore would 
not incentivize low-carbon investments. The Commission's answer to the oversupply was to postpone the  sale 
of allowances (backloading). The Commission initiated the process in comitology, hence at its opinion the timing 
of the auction was in its discretion.92 The Parliament’s environmental committee initially revoked the proposal, 
but later that year approved it in a new vote.93 The Parliament and the Council passed a decision, that allowed 
the Commission to adapt the timetable of the auctions.94 Factually, the Commission's regulation postpones the 
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auction of 900 million allowances, from years 2014-2016 to years 2019 and 2020.95 Backloading eased the 
oversupply that was depressing EUA prices, but it could not adequately reduce the excess allowances.96  
The Market Stability Reserve (MSR) was initially supposed to address the same problem as backloading, but in 
a more permanent way. The MSR addresses the supply of allowances by withdrawing 12 per cent of EUAs from 
auctioning and putting them into a reserve when the total number of allowances in circulation (TNAC) surpasses 
833 million.97 Vice versa, the MSR releases 100 million units from the reserve for auctioning, if the amount of 
allowances in circulation is less than 400 million. The MSR regulation inserts the backloaded allowances that 
were set to be auctioned in the course of 2019 and 2020 into the same reserve.98 The MSR will start absorbing 
EUAs in 2019.99 The MSR was revised even before it had started functioning. The intake rate was set to rise from 
12 to 24 per cent for the first five years of the MSR's operation. This modification was done as a part of the 
amendment of the ETS Directive that sets the rules for the upcoming fourth phase.  
3.6 The fourth phase of the EU ETS 
The fourth phase of the EU ETS is scheduled from 2021 to 2030. The greatest revisions that come with the 
Directive are:100 Increasing the LRF from 1.74 per cent to 2.2 per cent starting in 2021 and increasing the share 
of allowances that will be auctioned and renewing rules for the definition of an industry that is at "significant 
risk of carbon leakage". Furthermore, two funds will be established, an Innovation Fund and a Modernization 
Fund to support low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency. The method of allocating free allowances will 
be revised. The intake rate of the Market Stability Reserve will be doubled from 2019 until 2023.101 Allowances 
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will be annually permanently cancelled from the Market Stability Reserve from 2023. 102 Lastly, member states 
may cancel a volume of allowances according to their domestic electricity closures.103 
The rules for the fourth phase were recently published in the Directive (EU) 2018/410.104 The MSR reformation 
can be seen as a fundamental change, because it may cancel some of the allowances in the reserve permanently 
in 2023. Cancelling these allowances would be the first time the EU carbon market has been altered in this way. 
While, the cancellation may be contrary to the principle of protection of the legitimate expectations and legal 
certainty, it is necessary to remove excess supply in order to allow the price discovery to function. 
3.7 Price formation and the price development 
The EUA price formation process is similar to that of other commodities.105 The main difference between EUAs 
and traditional commodities is that the EUA market is a purely politically driven and a completely artificial 
creation of European Union legislation. Without the legislation that requires emitters to return allowances for 
their emissions, there would be no demand for EUAs. Therefore, the EUA price is largely affected by the EU's 
policy changes and expectations of policy changes. In particular, when there is a lot of surplus in the market and 
the unit prices are low, the main market drivers are policy changes.  
Entities that do not receive all of their allowances in free allocation have to participate in the market, either by 
acquiring the EUAs from auctions or buying them from the secondary market. 57 per cent of the allowances are 
auctioned during the third trading period. The majority of the trading conducted in the secondary market is 
done via exchanges.106 Similar to commodities trading, exchanges offer a variety of products, that can be used 
for trading. The simplest way to trade allowances is through spot-trading, where the ownership of an allowance 
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changes immediately. Commonly, trades are conducted with futures contracts, where the ownership of an 
allowance changes on a predetermined date at a predetermined price. Another way to trade is with derivatives, 
e.g. forwards or options.107 
The trading in the first phase was volatile, due to several factors, including the fact that participants were still 
familiarizing themselves with emission trading. Furthermore, problems with registries and changing national 
allocation plans caused uncertainty in 2005. Fluctuations in other commodity prices and stringing NAPs caused 
the prices to hike to 30 euros in midsummer 2005, although this period of high prices did not last long and prices 
dropped back to 20 euros.108 When the first verified emissions became public, it was clear that allocation was 
over generous. The European Commission acted on this, announcing that banking to the second phase would 
not be possible, thereby causing a drop in prices.109 During the first phase, the trading was mainly spot-
trading.110 Hence, as banking was not allowed from the first phase to the second phase, the EUA price sunk at 
the end of this period.111 
At the beginning of the second phase the market increased enormously both in terms of size and volume.112 At 
the later stage of the second phase the market price decreased greatly due to the economic recession; the 
market value decreased by almost one third from 2011 to 2012.113 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
production levels dropped, which naturally lowered emissions.114 
At the outset of the third phase, allowance prices were down and the price forecasts predicted a bearish future 
for EUAs. The depressed prices resulted from the oversupply of EUAs, which was caused by the economic 
recession, the flow of offset credits from outside the EU and overlapping EU-policies that reduced the demand 
for EUAs.115 The energy efficiency Directive and the renewable energy Directive were introduced for different 
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purposes than the ETS Directive, but they actually decreased the emissions as well. In addition, some national 
policies reduced the demand in the ETS sector.116 Furthermore, more efficient installations and an increased 
share of renewable energy reduced the demand for EUAs. On top of all that, the allocation was based on the 
emission levels before the financial crisis, and since the economic activity had slowed, participants were 
receiving more EUAs than they needed which sank the price even further.117 This development created a huge 
surplus of EUAs, a surplus that still exists. Even with the Commission's efforts, e.g. backloading, prices did not 
rise by much, and the EUA market was stuck at prices of less than 10 euros per tonne from 2012 until 2018.118 
During 2018, the expectations on the MSR have started to affect the EUA. The EUA price has tripled over the 
last year and many predictions suggest that it will still continue raising.119 It may be that the buyers are 
speculators aiming to profit from the expected increase or compliance entities hedging against the future's 
tightened market. 
 
B EU-wide carbon price floor models 
4 Construing the carbon price floor 
4.1 The Carbon Price Floor debate in the European Union 
In part B the possibility of implementing a carbon price floor at the whole European Union is studied. First, in 
chapter four, the existing ETSs which have a floor price are presented. Then in chapter five options for how the 
price floor could actually be implemented are presented. This part of the thesis focuses only on the 
implementation using EU’s legislative instruments e.g. directives and regulations. In 2012 the Commission 
published a report that contained different options for improving the EU ETS. One of these options was 
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discretionary price management mechanisms, e.g. a carbon price floor.120 The Commission's report mentioned 
two price management measures: Minimum price in the auctions and a price management reserve. The 
minimum price would possibly operate by setting the smallest amount at which the participants are allowed to 
bid. The auction reserve price would operate by setting -a price level that acts as the threshold for cancelling all 
the allowances in a reserve, if it is undercut. Subsequently, allowances would be released if the demand were 
to increase and reach the ceiling.121 The intention of the report was to act as a consultation document for 
stakeholders and the general public to present their views on proposed structural changes to the EU ETS. 
Generally, most stakeholders were opposed to such a measure and argued that the price discovery functions 
optimally via market mechanisms. An often-stated concern was that, if national policies, e.g. carbon taxes, 
capacity mechanisms or carbon price floors are uncoordinated, this would fragment and contradict the original 
aims of the EU ETS. However, some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and few energy companies were 
supportive of a carbon price floor or a ceiling.122 The report did not consider other options on how to form a 
carbon floor price, such as a CPF that would be implemented as a tax to top-up the EUA price, government's 
commitment to buy allowances below a certain price level, or a subsidy that would be paid to entities possessing 
more EUAs than the amount they are required to submit.123 
4.2 The top-up tax 
The top-up tax approach has been implemented in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, a CPF is currently being 
considered by a few other EU member states. The Netherlands has planned to implement a national carbon 
price floor in 2020 that would start with an 18 euro per tonne tax to top-up the EUA price. There are speculations 
on whether other member states e.g. Italy, France and Germany, would implement a carbon price floor.124 
France has been an active and engaged advocate for a regional carbon price floor and has even involved its 
highest officials.125 The CPF debate is linked to the increasing number of coal phase-outs that European countries 
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are pledging. Many of the western European countries are planning to cease coal powered electricity production 
by 2030 or earlier and have stated that there will be no more investments in coal plants after 2020.126 Finland 
is the first EU member state that has made a draft proposal for legislation on coal phase-out; it is currently in 
the consultation stage. Coal phase-out can be done by a command-and-control regulation, e.g. a regulation that 
prohibits the use of coal, or it can be implemented via economic steering, such as a carbon price floor. The 
concept behind a market-based coal phase-out is that the price of GHG emissions will rise very significantly, 
which in turn makes it impossible for coal-powered power plants to compete with other energy sources.  
The United Kingdom’s electricity has been largely produced by coal and natural gas.127 The UK reformed its 
environmental legislation by introducing the November 2000 United Kingdom’s Climate Change Programme. 
This package included new legislation such as the UK ETS and the Climate Change Levy. The UK ETS was a 
voluntary, economy-wide, national emission trading system.128 One of the main purposes of the scheme was to 
prepare the participants and stakeholders for the anticipated international emission trading system. 
Subsequently, the scheme was largely overrun by the introduction of the EU ETS.129 The 2008 Climate Change 
Act obliges the UK government to reduce carbon emissions by at least 80 per cent by 2050 compared to 1990.130 
The UK is still a member of the European Union and, consequently, still participating in the EU ETS. In order to 
put a price on carbon, the UK government wanted to take more stringent measures in the form of Carbon Price 
Support (CPS). The legal foundation of CPS is the Climate Change Levy (CCL) that was introduced in 2001.131 The 
CCL’s aim was to meet the UK’s goal of a 20 per cent reduction by 2010 compared to 1990 by affecting the 
energy use of businesses. The CCL is charged on industrial and commercial use of electricity, coal, natural gas 
and liquefied petroleum gas at a rate that echoes the energy content.132 The CCL exempted electricity 
generation from the levy, but from the first of April 2013 the CCL has had a separate CPS rate for fossil fuels 
used in electricity generation. 
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The UK Carbon Price Floor consists of the European Union’s emission allowance price and Carbon Price Support 
(CPS). Electricity generators that use gas, petroleum gas or other gaseous hydrocarbon in a liquid state or solid 
fossil fuels, such as coal to generate electricity are obliged to pay the CPS that becomes due when the fuel 
arrives to the power station.133 The CPS is enforced by omitting the exemption that the Finance Act 2000 
provided for fossil fuel supplies that are used in electricity generation. Since the first of April 2013, these fossil 
fuel supplies are no longer exempted and the supplies are subject to the Carbon Price Support rate.134 Carbon 
Price Support rates are defined for three different commodities that are used in electricity generation: gas in a 
gaseous state is 0.00331 pounds per kilowatt hour, liquefied petroleum gas is 0.05280 pounds per kilogram, and 
for coal and other solid fossil fuels is 1.54790 pounds per gigajoule on gross calorific value.135 The CPS rates are 
set by Her Majesty’s (HM) treasury by multiplying the difference between the government’s target price and 
the average annual ICE-ECX carbon price by the standard carbon emission factors. The CPS rates are settled for 
three years ahead.136 Oil is not in the scope of the CCL, but it is regulated under the Hydrocarbon Oil Duties Act 
1979. A generator that used oil for electricity generation was able to reclaim the amount of duty paid, after 
proving that the oil was used for electricity generation. Since the first of April 2013, the amount that can be 
reclaimed is reduced to equal the CPS in all fossil fuels, with a similar formula that is used to define the CPS rate 
in the CCL. The intention behind the CPF was to provide an annually rising trajectory that would reach a price of 
30 pounds per tonne of carbon dioxide in 2020. This is not likely to happen; hence HM treasury froze the CPS 
rate at 18 pounds at least until 2020.137  
4.3 The auction reserve price 
The auction reserve price can be combined with a price ceiling, effectively forming a price collar.138 This price 
collar operates in a manner similar to the MSR, the difference being that the trigger points are allowance prices 
rather than quantities of allowances. In case the auction is undersubscribed, all the bidders get the allowances 
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at the floor price. Conversely, if the allowance price at the auction hikes to the level of the price ceiling, more 
allowances will be released for auctioning. This arrangement is in place in the United States state level ETSs: 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and in California's cap-and-trade system. 
California’s Emission Trading Scheme was initiated in 2012 and the cap-and-trade scheme began with the first 
compliance period starting on 1 January 2013.139 California’s CAT covers facilities that have average annual 
emissions greater than 25,000 tonnes of GHGs in the sectors of industrial facilities, electricity generation, 
electricity imports, etc. This equates to approximately 400 liable entities and 80 per cent of the state’s total GHG 
emissions.140 The allowance price in the primary market is the lowest bid that allows the last available allowance 
to be sold.141  
California’s ETS has a price collar, including both a price floor and a price ceiling. The auction reserve price forms 
the floor price, and the price ceiling is the allowance containment reserve price. The auction reserve price forms 
a minimum that all the bidders will pay if the auction is undersubscribed, effectually preventing the auction 
prices from dipping below the floor.142 These unsold allowances will be put into a reserve and auctioned later 
on.143 The price in the secondary markets can go below the auction reserve price.144 
The allowance price containment reserve releases allowances for auctioning at the price level of the ceiling. 
Allowances will be sold with fixed prices that rise five per cent and the rate of inflation annually. Currently, the 
allowance price containment reserve is exhaustible and prices can theoretically go above the ceiling. These 
reserve sales can be separately held up to four times a year.145 From 2021 onwards, this ceiling will be hard; 
meaning, if this reserve exhausts, the allowances will be taken from future years' budgets.146 Similar price 
management measures are applied in the ETSs that are linked to California's ETS. For example, Quebec’s ETS 
started with a price floor of 10.75 Canadian dollars, and was set to rise five per cent plus the inflation rate 
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annually until 2020. In the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) joint auctions, the CPF is set at the level of the 
highest CPF in the participating jurisdictions.147 
The models that were presented in this chapter will be assessed from the EU’s legislative procedure’s point of 
view in the next chapter. The main question is whether the Council of the European Union needs a unanimous 
decision to implement the CPF. 
5 The implementation of the carbon price floor in the EU 
5.1 Different interests within the European Union 
What is the correct legislative procedure for implementing an EU-wide carbon price floor?  In this chapter this 
is studied first in the context of the UK model and then the same assessment is done regarding the California 
model. Before the assessments this chapter presents different decision-making processes in the EU institutions 
and presents arguments, why a certain procedure should be used to implement the CPF.  
It might seem that the European Union is uniform in its ambitious climate policy. However, the reality is not that 
straightforward. Member states have varying interests, GDPs and natural resources; consequently the starting 
points for GHG emission reduction in the various member states are different. For example, for some of the 
Eastern European countries other issues, such as fighting energy poverty and ensuring the security of supply, 
are a more urgent priority than mitigating climate change.148 Even the western EU member states with high 
GDPs have varying views on what the level of ambition should be and what would be the preferable energy 
mix.149 These diverging positions make it difficult to agree on common targets and goals in energy and climate 
policies, especially if the decision is subject to unanimity.  
5.2 Legislative procedures 
Article 288 of The treaty on the Functioning of the European Union gives the EU the power to execute its 
competences by regulations, Directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. These norms can be 
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legislative, delegated and implementing acts.150 Legislative acts are adopted either by ordinary or special 
legislative procedure. Acts that are not adopted according to these procedures are not legislative acts.151  
Article 191 of the TFEU is The treaty Article that provides the basis for legislative action in the field of 
environment.152 The general procedure in Article 192 is the ordinary legislative procedure. The Commission 
submits the proposal to the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of the European Union (EC), both of which 
have to accept the proposal. The EP and the EC can suggest amendments to the proposal. The idea behind this 
procedure is that all the institutions will be involved and will have the power to influence the proposal. In the 
ordinary legislative procedure, a majority of 55 per cent of the member states representing 65 per cent of the 
EU's population is required to pass the proposal in the EC.153 In the ordinary legislative procedure, a simple 
majority is required in the EP's first reading and an absolute majority in the second reading.154  
The TFEU Article 289 (2) contains a provision called the special legislative procedure. The procedure is specified 
in The treaty Article it concerns. Many treaty articles contain a provision that the effect of applying the special 
legislative procedure is unanimity in the Council e.g. this is the case of primarily fiscal measures.155 The TFEU 
Article 192 requires a unanimous decision in the Council for provisions primarily of a fiscal nature and measures 
significantly affecting a member state's choice between different energy sources and the general structure of 
its energy supply. Diagram 1 below illustrates the legislative procedures that could be applied in order to 
approve various types of CPFs. 
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     Diagram 1 
 
5.3 Legislative procedure regarding a top-up tax 
The top-up tax would need to be implemented as a new Directive or regulation. The top-up tax is arguably out 
of the ETS Directive's scope. A carbon price floor resembling the UK's top-up tax model would, by definition, fall 
under the category of a provision of primarily fiscal nature, as it is explicitly a tax. Therefore, it would require a 
unanimous decision in the Council of the European Union. The preferable implementation method would be a 
Directive that would set the rates and scope of the tax, but leave discretion for national governments on the 
administrative issues relating to the collection of the tax.156 The Directive could specify a similar annually rising 
tax rate trajectory as the UK's CPF, based on estimates of the EUA price level.157  
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5.4 The legal nature of the minimum price 
5.4.1 The case law of the European Court of Justice 
In order to define the correct legislative procedure for the implementation of a minimum price, the nature of 
the minimum price needs to be defined. The nature and the outcome of the minimum price determine the 
correct procedure.158 
Defining the legal nature of a minimum auction price is not straightforward because it is not explicitly a tax, but 
it could be considered as a tax. Some guidance can be drawn from the rulings of the European Court of Justice 
related to the EU ETS. The Advocate General's (AG) opinion in the aviation case was that the EU ETS is not a tax 
since there is no predefined rate and the amount payable is defined by supply and demand.159 The ECJ agreed 
with the AG's view and stated that the financial burden is not a fixed fee imposed by the governments, but set 
by markets. The ECJ emphasized that the EU ETS should not be considered as a tax, regardless of the fact that 
the member states have discretion on the revenue spending. Furthermore, it argued that the purpose of the 
system is not to generate public revenue, but to reduce emissions.  
According to the reasoning of the ruling of the European Court of Justice, the key factors in definition of a tax 
are: the amount is fixed and that it is collected for the purpose of public revenue.160 The minimum price would 
set a fixed minimal amount for an allowance, but whether the aim of the minimum price is to generate public 
revenue is not clear. The main purpose of the minimum price would be to incentivize more investments into 
clean technologies by providing certainty to the EUA price levels. This does not exclude the fact that it would 
raise public revenues, which could be considered as one of the purposes for the amendment. According to this 
determination, the minimum price could be considered as a tax. This would imply that unanimity in the Council 
is required for creating a CPF. However, the minimum price implemented according to California's model is not 
absolute and the price can go below the minimum price in the secondary markets. This conclusion would suggest 
that the minimum price should not be considered as a constituting a fixed amount and therefore not as a tax. 
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However, the EU has not enforced or tried to enforce a policy that would have introduced a minimum price in 
the auctions. The provision in the auctioning regulation that allows the auctioning platform to cancel the auction 
if the clearing price is significantly lower than in the secondary market immediately after the auction cannot be 
considered as a price floor since it varies in every auction and it is not public.161 Therefore, it is unclear whether 
it would be considered as a provision of primarily fiscal nature. The EU ETS Directive was implemented according 
to ordinary legislative procedure. Scholars have discussed whether it was legislated according to the correct 
procedure and whether it should have been decided unanimously.162 Nonetheless, the legal basis of the EU ETS 
Directive has not been contested in the ECJ and, as long as there is no verdict stating contrary, the ETS remains 
on a solid legal basis. This view is supported by the fact that all the amendments to the Directive so far have 
been made according to ordinary legislative procedure. In fact, the ECJ has found that the MSR was correctly 
established in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure.  
The legality of the decision establishing MSR in to the EU ETS was contested in the ECJ by the Polish government. 
In its decision, the ECJ considered whether the requirement of significant impact was fulfilled. Poland claimed 
in the plea that the MSR should have been established in accordance with a different legislative procedure, since 
it is de facto a measure that significantly impacts the member state's choice between different energy sources. 
The Court rejected Poland's claim on the basis that the MSR is only a tool that ensures the proper functioning 
of the ETS, and therefore the ordinary legislative procedure was correctly chosen legislative instrument.163 The 
Court stated further that it was not necessary to study MSR's possible impact on a single member state's energy 
mix. This ruling could be interpreted for the possible CPF, if it were found necessary to impose a minimum price 
in the auctions in order to retain a reasonable price level to reach the goals set out in the Directive, e.g. spur 
investments in low-carbon technologies. The minimum price could be imposed on the EU level in accordance 
with ordinary legislative procedure. However, the ECJ and the Advocate General explicitly stated that the MSR 
is a quantitative measure not aiming to increase the price of an allowance, as Poland claimed in its plea.164 The 
minimum price would undoubtedly be aiming to increase the price of an allowance. A definitive conclusion 
cannot be drawn from the case, whether a price management measure would be treated similarly as a necessity 
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for the proper functioning of the ETS or as something that is beyond the scope of the Directive and has a 
significant impact on the member state's choice between energy sources.165  
5.4.2 Defining cap-and-trade in California  
In California a cap-and-trade programme with a soft price collar has been implemented and its legality has been 
questioned. The legal system of the state of California and the US as a whole are quite different from the EU's 
sui generis legal structure. The suits against the California Air Resources Board (CARB) offer interesting factors 
regarding whether the ETS with a soft price floor should be considered as a tax. 
A suit by the California Chamber of Commerce was filed against the CARB, arguing that it lacked the authority 
to construe a cap-and-trade programme, because it is factually a tax. This would have required a two-thirds 
majority of votes in the Legislature, which the amendment did not have. The District Court of Appeal in 
Sacramento dismissed the notion and upheld the CARB’s right to continue auctions.166 
The California Chamber of Commerce suit was filed against the Board, its members and its executive officer, 
following a second suit by Morning Star Packing Company and other claimants against the same defendants on 
essentially the same grounds. The trial Court saw that these two cases were related and heard a joint oral 
argument and jointly rejected the petitions. Both plaintiffs appealed and the California Third District Court of 
Appeal (Third Court of Appeal) consolidated the appeals.167 
5.4.3 The hallmarks of a tax 
The plaintiffs claimed that the CARB did not have the authority to design a market-based emissions reduction 
system and that the revenue generated by the system amounts to a tax. This would violate the two-thirds 
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majority requirement of the Constitution of the State of California (CSC) Proposition 13. California's Third District 
Court of Appeal viewed that the auction of allowances does not exceed the scope of legislative delegation given 
to the CARB. Whether the auctioning should be regarded as a tax, the Third Court of Appeal. stated that 
auctioning regulation does not fulfil the hallmarks of a tax.168 
The Third Court of Appeal. upheld the trial Court’s decision, that even though the Global Warming Solutions Act 
did not expressly mention auctioning, the wording of the Act or any other factor did not point out, that a cap-
and-trade system in which part of the allowances is auctioned, could not be used to fulfil required emission 
reductions. The petitioners had essentially seven arguments why there was no mandate for the CARB to 
effectuate cap-and-trade that would include auctioning feature.169 
Whether the auctioning system is a tax, subject to Proposition 13 of the Constitution of the State of California, 
the Third Court of Appeal. did agree with the trial Court’s view that the auction sale is not a tax and therefore 
does not violate Proposition 13 of the CSC. However, the Third Court of Appeal. diverged in the method of 
analysis, that the trial Court used to determine the violation of Proposition 13. Proposition 13 requires a two-
thirds majority in both houses for “Any changes in state taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing rates or 
changes in methods of computation.”170 The trial Court started to analyze the case with the notion that the term 
'tax' has no fixed meaning and, further, looked into cases that distinguish taxes from regulatory fees and was 
able to categorize different fees. Finally, the trial Court concluded that the primary purpose of these charges is 
regulatory; the fees are helping to achieve the Act’s goal and therefore do not surmount the cost of regulatory 
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activities. The charges are merely a by-product of the programme and the participating entities receive a 
valuable and tradable right to emit GHGs.  
The Third Court of Appeal. analyzed the case differently. It did not see the applicability of “Sinclair Paint” test in 
this case.171 It set out two hallmarks of a tax: “It is compulsory and it does not grant any special benefit to the 
payer.”172 
The plaintiffs claimed that the participation in the auctions is not voluntary, because all of the allowances are 
not allocated for free and one has to obtain enough allowances in order to continue doing business in 
California.173 The Court did not agree with this view because there are ways to reduce GHG emissions, 
allowances can be bought from the secondary market, and one can obtain offset credits from funding emission 
reduction projects outside the scheme. In addition, the Court pointed out that non-compliant entities 
participate in the secondary market, as opposed to taxes.174 Judge J. Hull left a dissenting opinion stating that 
the participation is not voluntary. He argued that it is no different than saying that paying income tax is 
voluntary, because one has the option to not earn income. In his opinion, acquiring allowances from the auctions 
is necessary, if the compliant entity wishes to do business in the state of California.175   
5.4.4 Benefit to the payer 
The plaintiffs backed up their claims by pointing out that polluting air in California was free before the CAT 
scheme. The Court dismissed the argument as meaningless by responding that no one has a vested right to 
pollute California’s air. Alternatively the CARB could have enacted a command-and-control programme that 
would have left the entities with no other option than emission reductions.  
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Furthermore, the Court looked at whether or not the allowances are valuable commodities. The California Code 
of Regulations § 95820 states that an allowance does not constitute a property right. However, the concept of 
a property right depends on the context, and the Court made a distinction between due process property rights 
and takings property rights.176 As stated in the regulation, an allowance does not construe a property right in 
the takings sense. Allowances can be revoked or modified as a result of changes in state policy. This does not 
mean that the allowance holder would not have property rights in any sense; the owner is allowed to transfer 
the allowances and exclude others from the use of that particular allowance. This makes it a property right in 
the due process sense. The Third Court of Appeal. ruled that since no one is compelled to buy allowances and 
the allowances are a valuable and tradable item, it is not a tax. Therefore, it does not violate Proposition 13.177 
In the dissenting opinion Judge J. Hull pointed out again that the plain language of the Act states that the 
allowances do not construe a property right and therefore it is not a valuable commodity.178 
The requirement of a two-thirds majority is seemingly similar to the TFEU's requirement of unanimity. However, 
the scope is much broader in California, as "any changes" require a two-thirds majority; in the EU only 
"provisions of primarily fiscal nature" require unanimity. In the 2010 amendment in California the wording was 
changed to apply only to "taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing revenues". The ECJ applied this same 
rationale when it stated that the inclusion of aviation to the EU ETS does not constitute a tax on aviation.179   
5.4.5 Legislative procedure for the implementation of the minimum price 
The minimum price in the auctions could be implemented by amending the ETS Directive and the auctioning 
regulation. This is due to the fact that the minimum price would be incorporated in the ETS and therefore fall 
within the scope of existing regulation. The minimum price could also be possible to implement it as a 
completely new Directive, regulation or decision, but preferably the change would be incorporated by amending 
existing legislation. The procedure would likely be the ordinary legislative procedure, a qualified majority in the 
                                                           
176 Takings Clause is referring to the US Constitution’s Fifth Amendment: “...nor shall private property be taken for public, without just 
compensation.” Due Process is referring to the US Constitution’s Fifth Amendment: “No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law...” and the Fourteenth Amendment: “Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law…” See the Heritage Foundation, 2017. Takings Clause and Due Process Clause. 
177 Ibid. p. 29. 
178 Dissenting opinion. Ibid. p. 54-78. 





Council, as all of the ETS amendments have been implemented in this manner. The equivalent procedure used 
in California's CAT, which resembles what the EU ETS with a soft price floor would probably look like.180 The 
requirements for legislative changes are different in California, but the core element is similar; to ensure that 
legislation that has a big impact receives sufficient support in the legislature.181 
The amendment could be challenged in the ECJ on the grounds of incorrect legislative procedure. The TFEU 
Article 263 allows the ECJ to conduct judicial review if essential procedural requirements are violated or The 
treaty Articles are infringed.182 The petitioners would be likely arguing that the amendment should have been 
adopted unanimously. If the EU is waiting until all member states can agree on introduction of price 
management measures, these measures are likely to never be implemented.    
 
C Regional carbon price floor models 
6. Member states' competence to introduce a carbon price floor 
6.1 Division of competence between member states and the European Union 
This part of the thesis assesses the possibility of implementing a carbon price floor in a sub EU-level in two or 
more member states. This regional model is considered because it is not certain whether there is enough 
political support to set a price floor in the EU-level. The same two models; the top-up tax and the minimum 
price in the auctions are assessed. The means of cooperation that this thesis studies are an international 
agreement between participating governments and an EU-legislative instrument enhanced cooperation. As the 
diagram 2 above shows in total four different instruments are studied. Chapter six looks at what is the 
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competence of a member state to unilaterally modify and add elements to the ETS. After this the upsides and 
downsides of different type of international agreements are studied. This is because, if the price floor is 
implemented using the unilateral competence, the participating states have to use some sort of agreement in 
order to make the cooperation stable. The chapter seven assesses alternative cooperation model for 
international agreements: an EU legislative instrument called enhanced cooperation.   
 
 
     Diagram 2 
 
Assuming that the carbon price floor is implemented similarly to the California system but still could not get the 
required majority to be implemented in the European Union scale, it could then be implemented regionally. The 
underlying rationale behind France's proposal of establishing a regional carbon price floor is that many member 
states will likely be opposed to the establishment of an EU-wide minimum price. In a regional solution only those 
member states that are willing to participate in the cooperation will participate; therefore, the participating 

























The studied options how to implement a regional carbon price floor to the EU ETS are: a treaty outside the EU 
legal framework and an enhanced cooperation mechanism within the EU Treaties. If the CPF is implemented 
within the framework of enhanced cooperation, the rules governing that cooperation will define the legality of 
the proposed CPF. Regarding a treaty outside the EU's legal framework, the legality is equal to a single member 
state's ability to unilaterally implement the CPF.  
The competence of the European Union is attributed, meaning that the EU has competence only in areas where 
it is given in the treaties, and the competence not given to the EU shall remain with the member states. This 
division of powers was clarified in the Lisbon Treaty.183 The competence given to the EU is divided into exclusive 
competence, shared competence and competence to take supporting, coordinating or supplementary action.184  
The area of shared competence covers a broad variety of activities and it is envisioned to be the default 
competence; if the competence is not exclusive or supportive it is shared. The member states may use their 
legislative powers, if the EU has not exercised its powers or the EU has ceased to exercise its powers. This 
legislative power of a member state can only be utilized to the extent that the EU has not exercised its legislative 
competence.185 Article 4 of the TFEU has a non-exhaustive list of areas that are in the area of shared competence 
including, e.g., internal market, environment and energy. The paradigm shift towards a more EU led system 
came along with the Lisbon Treaty; and subsequently, energy policy has been a shared competence. Especially 
regarding energy, this transition is not self-evident, as it has traditionally been a sector of the economy that has 
been largely at the full discretion of member states.  
In the field of shared competence, a legal principle called the pre-emption doctrine is applied.186 The pre-
emption doctrine was amplified in the Lisbon Treaty. Article 2(2) of the TFEU states: "The Member states shall 
exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence." According to this 
doctrine, member states can exercise their legislative competence, as long as the EU has not exercised its 
competence and shall cease to exercise their competence when the EU has exercised its competence. The loss 
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of the member states' power to enact legislation is ultimately for the ECJ to decide. The pre-emption doctrine 
is linked closely to the supremacy of EU law. The supremacy of EU law means that in the normative hierarchy 
EU law is lex superior derogat legi inferiori in relation to national law. Meaning; if a national and EU law are 
leading to conflicting results, the latter will be applied.187  
6.2 Competence to introduce a regional top-up tax 
While taxation traditionally has been a policy area largely at the discretion of member states, the national tax 
has to be compatible with the requirements of the internal market. Article 110 of the TFEU prohibits the use of 
protectionist taxation measures.188 For the tax measure to be compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU, it has to 
pursue aims that are compatible with the treaties and secondary law, the base for levying the tax has to be 
objective and the tax cannot discriminate between domestic production and production in other member 
states.189 A top-up tax would be based on the carbon content of the fuel used for electricity generation. If it 
were levied similarly as in the UK for gas, coal and oil, the basis would be objective and non-discriminatory 
because the rate is the same - regardless of where the fuel is coming from. The aim is clearly in line with the aim 
of promoting prudent and rational utilization of natural resources, mentioned in Article 191 of the TFEU.  
Besides that, a top-up tax is compatible with the secondary legislation. As for the secondary legislation, the EU's 
Directive on taxation of energy products and electricity (energy tax directive) and the Directive on general 
arrangements for excise duty (excise duty directive) provide the governing framework.190 The general rule in 
the energy tax directive is that energy products used for electricity production are exempted from taxation.191 
However, a derogation in the same Article allows member states to tax energy products used for electricity 
production for environmental policy purposes, provided that the tax is compatible with the excise duty 
Directive. Article 1 of the excise duty Directive allows the introduction of an excise duty to goods that are in the 
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scope of the energy taxation Directive.192 A top-up tax levied on the carbon content of the fuel used for 
electricity generation is clearly implemented for an environmental policy purpose and is levied on a good 
mentioned in energy tax Directive e.g. coal, gas and oil.193 Moreover, the UK has already implemented a national 
CPF that has been approved by the Commission. In its reply to the UK's state aid notification, the Commission 
affirmed that the CPF is a non-harmonized tax covered by the Directive 2008/118/EC.194 It is clear that other 
member states are allowed to do the same tax arrangement that the UK has. There is no difference in whether 
the CPF would be implemented unilaterally by a single member state or if this would be done in multiple 
member states simultaneously due to a multilateral agreement. 
6.3 Competence to introduce a regional minimum price 
6.3.1 The effect of the carbon price floor 
A regionally implemented minimum price in the auctions would modify the functioning of the EU ETS 
significantly. Participating member states would impose a minimum price to their share of auctioned allowances 
and the non-participating member states would continue to auction their allowances without the minimum 
price, as before. The problem with this approach is that the demand for the allowances auctioned without a 
minimum price would increase, since obviously entities located in the participating member states would still 
want to purchase their allowances at the cheapest possible price. This phenomenon would increase the price of 
regular allowances without the price floor. Tackling the increased demand would require limiting the possibility 
to purchase other allowances than those with the CPF. Fragmenting the EU-wide market does not strike as a 
good idea and the legality of this measure is questionable. The following questions need to be answered in order 
to know whether EU legislation allows these measures: Is it possible for the member states to regulate the 
auctions, since the EU has already implemented auctioning regulation? Can a single member state impose a 
minimum price for the allowances it auctions? Is it possible for a member state to force its entities to purchase 
allowances solely from its own auctions? 
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If a single member state has the competence to regulate the aforementioned areas, it is clear that a group of 
member states can do the same. If, a majority of the EU member states wanted to include price management 
measures in the ETS, it would be advisable to go ahead with an EU-wide solution.  
6.3.2 The pre-emption doctrine 
The EU has implemented an auctioning regulation that unifies the auctioning procedure. Directive 2003/87 
states: "By 30 June 2010, the Commission shall adopt a regulation on timing, administration and other aspects 
of auctioning to ensure that it is conducted in an open, transparent, harmonized and non-discriminatory 
manner." Article 7 of the auctioning regulation governs the formation of the clearing price: "An auction platform 
shall sort bids submitted to it in the order of the price bid. Where the price of several bids is the same, these bids 
shall be sorted through a random selection according to an algorithm determined by the auction platform before 
the auction. The volumes bid shall be added up, starting with the highest bid price. The price of the bid at which 
the sum of the volumes bid matches or exceeds the volume of allowances auctioned shall be the auction clearing 
price." The auctioning regulation allows member states to opt out of the EU's common auctioning platform and 
have their national auctions held in a different platform. Germany, the UK and Poland have resorted to this 
option.  Regardless of the opt out, member states are still subject to the same auctioning rules. As the price 
formation is already regulated in the auctioning regulation, it does not leave competence for member states to 
modify the auctioning by introducing minimum prices or other unilateral measures. Therefore, the member 
states would not have the competence to introduce price regulations unilaterally or multilaterally without 
changing the auctioning regulation on the EU level.  
6.3.3 Article 193 of The treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
The subject needs further studying, since the EU ETS falls under the category of environment and it is 
implemented on the basis of Article 192 of the TFEU. The EU has enacted the auctioning regulation, which 
explicitly puts in place a governing framework on how the price forms in the auctions.195 Unilaterally imposing 
a minimum price in the auctions would affect entities from every member state, since the auctions are open for 
participation for entities from all member states, and the demand for allowances without the minimum price 
                                                           





would naturally increase. This could be avoided by requiring the entities from the member state that is imposing 
the minimum price to purchase only allowances with the minimum price. This restriction would limit the price 
increase only to entities that are from the member state imposing the measure. Regardless of whether the 
system would be amended with or without the minimum price, the legality of this revision would likely be 
subject to challenges that might find the regional minimum price in the auctions incompatible with the TFEU. 
This could be done under an exception included in Article 193 that allows member states to adopt more 
stringent measures for environmental protection, provided that these measures are compatible with The treaty 
Articles, albeit the EU has used its competence. In the ECJ case law applying Article 193, two conditions that the 
restriction needs to fill have been developed: it cannot undermine the coherence of the harmonization rule and 
it has to be compatible with The treaty law. 
Compatibility with The treaty Articles 
The meaning of "compatible with The treaty Articles" needs further clarification. This requirement can be 
divided into cases where the measure affects the trade between member states and where it does not.196 The 
unilateral price increase clearly affects trade between member states. A minimum price imposed even by a 
single member state would limit the demand for those particular allowances and the ECJ could interpret this as 
a barrier to trade. More precisely, this measure could be seen as a violation of the free movement of goods or 
a violation of the free movement of capital, depending on how the EUA is seen legally. In the EU, the legal status 
of an EUA is not as clearly framed as it is in California's ETS.197 The Emission Trading Directive describes an 
allowance as a tradable permit to emit a tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent during a specified period. The legal 
nature of an EUA is explained more widely in the registry regulation's Article 40: "An allowance or a Kyoto unit 
shall be a fungible, dematerialized instrument that is tradable on the market."198 The EUA has been defined 
variously in the market context as well. For example, earlier the EUA was seen as a commodity in the spot market 
and as a financial instrument in the futures market.199 The introduction of the amendment to the Directive on 
Markets in Financial Instruments defined EUAs as financial instruments, both in the derivatives market and the 
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spot market.200 It seems that the definition of the EUA depends on the situation. De lege ferenda, it would be 
good to modify the Emission Trading Directive to clearly state what an allowance is, to provide certainty for a 
uniform approach across the EU.  
Defining the legal nature of an allowance is important for the possible modification of the auctioning rules 
unilaterally - especially, if this includes fragmenting the market by restricting the ability of companies registered 
in a certain country to purchase other allowances than those with the minimum price. It would affect the 
movement and tradability of the allowances; therefore, it is vital to find out under which area of the EU's 
fundamental freedoms the movement of EUAs fall. The practical solution is to regard the restrictions both from 
the perspective of the free movement of capital and the free movement of goods. The second step in assessing 
the acceptability of the more restrictive measure is the necessity and the proportionality test. It imposes a 
requirement that the more stringent measure should be allowed, unless it has a significantly disproportionate 
effect on free movement.201 This again is a matter of interpretation and would differ depending on which 
country or countries implement the minimum price. Depending on the magnitude of impact that the measure 
has on free movement, it might not prove compatible with the requirements for undertaking a more stringent 
measure, provided in Article 193 of the TFEU.  
The harmonization 
Hitherto, in the application of the TFEU Article 193 the ECJ has imposed further requirements and it has not 
allowed derogation from the EU secondary legislation, if it is fully harmonized. The EU ETS Directive and the 
auctioning regulation are not fully harmonized, since they leave room for national choices, for example 
extending ETS to cover other sectors.  The ECJ has required that a derogation that puts in place a more stringent 
measure in an area that is not fully harmonized cannot undermine the coherence of the harmonization rule. 
202Sadeleer gives an example that nothing prevents a member state from unilaterally increasing the fine for not 
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submitting an allowance. However, he gives another example that requiring new installations to be equipped 
with carbon capture technology would not be possible on the basis of Article 193.203 
The compatibility of a national more stringent environmental measure with the EU legislation has been assessed 
by the ECJ several times. In a waste landfilling case, the ECJ ruled that a more stringent national measure can be 
implemented, if it pursues the same objectives as the EU-level regulation.204 In a case relating to the shipment 
of waste, the ECJ stated that national measures need to be compatible with the regulation referred to and with 
all EU legislation and principles.205 In a case regarding the application of a gift tax to the freely allocated 
allowances, the ECJ stated that the national tax was not to be considered as a more stringent measure in the 
meaning of Article 193 of the TFEU.206 The Emission Trading Directive contained a provision that 90 per cent of 
the allowances were to be allocated for free between the years 2008 and 2012. According to the ECJ, a tax that 
would be levied on the freely allocated allowances would be contrary to the aim of the Directive. In the case 
regarding Italian bird conservation legislation, strengthened earlier, the ECJ adopted the interpretation that if 
the national more stringent measure is pursuing the same objectives as the directive, then it is allowed to go 
further than the Directive.207 In the case concerning the legality of the MSR, the ECJ stated that the merits of 
the legal basis of a certain measure are to be contested by the aim and the content of the act. This means that 
the act is to be studied against the aim and the actual effect of the implementation of the act.208  
The minimum price implemented on the grounds of Article 193 would need to be furthering the aims of the 
Emission Trading Directive and the auctioning regulation in a way that it does not violate the fundamental 
freedoms. The minimum price would be in contrast with the harmonizing aim of the Directive and the auctioning 
regulation. Combined with the concerns of barriers to free movement, a member state might not be able to 
utilize the exception provided in Article 193.  
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6.4 Treaty outside the EU's legislative framework 
As the chapter 6.1 analysis shows, member states do have the competence to implement a top-up tax 
unilaterally. There is no obstacle for multiple member states to do this simultaneously. Two or more member 
states could agree on implementing a top-up tax via an international treaty or an international soft law 
agreement. The upside of a treaty without involving the EU is the increased flexibility and the speed of 
implementation, which would not be possible with the EU's procedural bureaucracy.209 On the downside, the 
stability and uniformity will suffer and the transaction costs involved in multilateral negotiations are higher.210 
In the history of European integration plenty of treaties have been signed between member states outside the 
spheres of the European Union's institutional framework. The Schengen Treaty did not originally involve the EU, 
and the Benelux and Nordic cooperation are examples of alternative integration.211 A more specific area of 
cooperation would be Norway' and Sweden's bilateral electricity certificate market.212  
A good model to use in regional CPF could be the Prum Convention. The Prum Convention is an 
intergovernmental cooperation agreement on combating cross-border crime and terrorism. The agreement was 
concluded outside the EU's institutional framework. This being said, The treaty is implemented without 
prejudice to the European Union law and is open to any EU member state.213 Furthermore, the preamble of the 
Convention mentions, an explicit aim to bring the Prum Convention into the EU framework.  
These examples prove that even though member states have given away part of their sovereignty and treaty-
making power, they still have competence to agree on multiple issues without the EU's involvement.  
A top-up tax can be agreed between the participating member states with different instruments. The most 
vague form of agreement is a political agreement stating that all the participating member states will implement 
a tax that tops up the EUA price. In contrast, an intergovernmental treaty that acknowledges the objectives as 
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a legally binding commitment is considered as hard law, similarly to national laws.214 In between, there are 
different soft law instruments such as Memorandum of understandings, that have a varying legal status.215  
6.5 Minimum auction price implemented via a treaty 
As mentioned before, the competence for multiple member states to agree on a minimum price outside of the 
EU's legal framework is equal to a single member state's legislative competence to impose it unilaterally. As the 
analysis showed, the member states do not likely have the competence to impose a minimum price unilaterally, 
because the preconditions of Article 193 of the TFEU are not present. If member states presumed their 
competence and imposed a minimum price without the EU's involvement, the effects would be hard to predict 
and the disruption and uncertainty in the EUA market could lead to unpredictable consequences. Furthermore, 
the legality of these measures would most likely be challenged by the Eastern member states, which rely heavily 
on coal-powered electricity generation. The minimum price should only be implemented uniformly across the 
EU or, if there is not enough political support, via enhanced cooperation among willing countries.  
However, if member states were to resort to this option, the requirements for a treaty of this sort are similar to 
those of the top-up tax, as described below. 
6.6 Top-up tax implemented in the form of a treaty 
Treaties form the core of international law. States have a myriad of treaties between each other in various 
contexts.216 The effect of a treaty depends on the implementation, on the tradition how international law is 
applied in the state, and on how the signatory states enforce it. In the states applying the monistic theory of 
international law, a treaty does not need to be implemented in to national law. According to the dualist theory 
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of international law, a treaty needs to be implemented in to national law before it is applicable.217 Therefore, 
an individual in a dualist state cannot invoke a right based on The treaty in a national Court. It can only base its 
claim on the national law that is implemented accordingly with The treaty.218  
Generally, treaties and aspects such as making treaties are governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. The treaty itself defines when it will be in force. Typically, treaties come into force by signature or the 
combination of signature and ratification.219 The ratification process is not uniform and varies between states, 
for example by requiring a Parliamentary approval.220  
There are no obstacles in international law that would prevent states from agreeing on a top-up tax with each 
other. Nonetheless, a couple of issues should be considered when drafting such a treaty. The design of the CPF 
treaty is crucial for the stability of the arrangement, especially if it is implemented outside the EU's legal 
framework. The treaty should contain provisions for withdrawal from The treaty. Normally, withdrawal from a 
treaty is possible, if the treaty has specific provisions governing that or if all members give their consent for the 
withdrawal.221 For instance, Article 28 of the Paris Agreement imposes a requirement that the party can first 
notify its wish to withdraw from The treaty after three years have passed from the date The treaty entered into 
force. The withdrawal will be effective one year after the notification.222 Including this mechanism would build 
up trust that the CPF will not be immediately annulled.  
If a state wishing to withdraw -decides that it will no longer obey the agreement and decides to change the 
domestic tax law, there is little that other states can do. The likelihood of compliance can be increased with 
sanctions and dispute resolution mechanisms. However, including sanctions or dispute resolution mechanisms 
in the treaties is not a popular choice among states. The increased compliance that accompanies sanctions and 
dispute resolution mechanisms comes at the cost of the parties of the agreement, and dispute resolution does 
not benefit the winning state. Therefore, these mechanisms actually result in a net loss to the parties as a whole 
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and they are, in fact, better off without these mechanisms.223 This can be avoided by imposing an obligation to 
pay monetary damages for treaty violations. A priori states have been reluctant to agree on damages, and most 
treaties do not contain the obligation to pay damages for a violation.224 It is doubtful that EU member states 
agreeing on a regional CPF between each other would incorporate this kind of clause in The treaty. Some form 
of dispute resolution mechanism and compensation for violations might be beneficial for guaranteeing 
compliance. The best option for dispute resolution would be to incorporate an arbitration clause to avoid 
concerns relating to national Courts. 
The Vienna Convention has rules that apply to a situation where The treaty has no provisions concerning the 
withdrawal from The treaty. Article 56 states that withdrawal is possible if: "(a)it is established that the parties 
intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may 
be implied by the nature of The treaty. And A party shall give not less than twelve months' notice of its intention 
to denounce or withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1."225  
A treaty concerning the CPF would not likely cause disputes, since it would only involve domestic measures. A 
preferable option would be to resolve disagreements in arbitration by including an arbitration clause in The 
treaty Articles. Withdrawal is not an issue that necessarily needs to be included in the treaty unless the parties 
want to diverge from the default rule provided by the Vienna Convention. 
6.7 Soft law agreement 
There is not necessarily a need to govern the CPF with a treaty. It could be sufficient enough to politically agree 
on the measures each participating state will take and implement them in national legislation. In fact, the 
regional ETSs, the Western Climate Initiative and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the US, are governed 
with memorandums of understanding (MoU). The MoU provides a model rule.  
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The Western Climate Initiative is a linked North American cap-and-trade system. WCI Incorporated (Inc.) is a 
non-profit organization that provides administrative and technical support for the implementation of state and 
provincial ETSs. Furthermore, WCI, Inc. handles the joint auction proceedings.  
At most, the WCI had 11 participating states; however, many of the member states withdrew and the WCI 
currently covers the US state of California and the Canadian provinces of Quebec and Ontario.226 The remaining 
members of the WCI have linked their ETSs with each other.227 
The Western Climate Initiative is governed by a decentralized model, which is construed of a non-binding 
agreement that, is then implemented in to the participating state’s legislation.228 The “model-rule” for the WCI 
is called the Design for the Western Climate Initiative Regional Program. This accord provides a model for the 
states that are willing to implement the ETS.229  
The WCI’s compatibility with the US and Canadian constitutions has been a controversial issue. The WCI involves 
only provinces and states, which have limited legislative power; furthermore, sub-national laws can be 
superseded by federal legislation. Fundamentally, the question of whether the WCI should be contemplated as 
hard law or soft law defines its constitutional acceptability both in Canada and in the US.230 The structure of the 
WCI model-rule as a non-binding legislative “recommendation” and WCI, Inc. as an entity with no regulatory 
authority makes it hard to perceive as hard law.231 
The RGGI started with seven states signing the Memorandum of Understanding in 2005.232 The RGGI is governed 
by state-level regulation: each of the participating states enacts regulations following the Model Rule. 
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Amendments to the programme are done by updating and incorporating the changes to the renewed version 
of the Model Rule and then enforcing these changes in state legislation.233 Each state has at its discretion the 
control of the supply of allowances equal to its share of the total number of allowances. States can decide the 
percentage of auctioned allowances and the allowances allocated for free in their Carbon Dioxide Budget 
Trading Program.234 The RGGI is governed by the non-profit corporation Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
Incorporated.235  
The problem with the non-binding structure of the RGGI and the WCI is the stability. The states have at their 
discretion the ability to withdraw from the agreement, and this can cause a lot of uncertainty among the 
participating entities. For example, the RGGI lost a signatory member when New Jersey withdrew from the MoU 
in 2011.236  
These structures utilized in America's ETSs provide useful examples of how to cooperate. The member states 
willing to implement a top-up tax could cooperate together by agreeing on model rules and creating a lightly 
structured organization that would coordinate and assess what the rate of the CPF should be for the coming 
years. However, as one can conclude from the RGGI and the WCI experiences, the stability of a non-binding soft 
law agreement is a real concern. As mentioned before, the concern relates to all treaties and, due to state 
sovereignty, cannot be fully solved. However, making The treaty binding indicates a higher level of commitment 
from the participating states and can make it less volatile to political changes. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that the only method for ensuring stability and compatibility is to implement the CPF via EU institutions.  
7 European Union’s enhanced cooperation 
7.1 Treaty on European Union Article 20 
This chapter studies the ten conditions that derive from the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
and the Treaty on European Union on the sub EU level legislative instrument called enhanced cooperation. The 
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rationale for studying this is the same as the motive of studying the possibility of using a treaty to implement 
the floor price, there might not be enough political support to implement such a reform at the EU-level.  
The Amsterdam Treaty introduced a method called enhanced cooperation.237 The enhanced cooperation rules 
were loosened in the Nice Treaty and further crystallized in the Lisbon Treaty. Hitherto, enhanced cooperation 
has been used in couple of areas, for example in the so-called "Rome 3 Regulation" concerning international 
divorce and in the European patent with unitary effect.238 Article 20 of the TEU lays down the general framework 
for enhanced cooperation, which is concretized in Articles 326 to 334 of the TFEU. The ten conditions for 
enhanced cooperation in the context of a carbon price floor are explained below. Each headline assesses one 
condition and the chapter 7.12 concludes.  
7.2 Minimum of nine member states participating 
Article 20 (2) of the TEU requires that: "The decision authorising enhanced cooperation shall be adopted by the 
Council as a last resort, when it has established that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained 
within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole, and provided that at least nine Member states participate 
in it."  
An in-depth analysis about whether the carbon price floor would get nine supporters is hard to make, but an 
initial idea of the current support can be drawn from the public statements member states have made. France 
is clearly in favour of the regional carbon price floor.239 The Netherlands is already planning implementation of 
a national top-up tax by 2020.240 Italy is planning a coal phase-out by 2025 and one of the options on how to 
implement this has been a carbon price floor.241 Germany's position is a big question mark: Germany has 
confirmed a nuclear phase-out and is planning to simultaneously phase out coal.242 It is still uncertain whether 
the coal phase-out will come in a form similar to the nuclear phase-out or through e.g. a carbon price floor.243 
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Germany's participation is in many ways crucial since it is the largest economy, has the biggest share of votes in 
the EU and the largest GHG emissions. The United Kingdom already has a CPF, but its participation in the EU ETS 
and the EU as a whole is unclear and dependent on the negotiations around the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom from the EU. The Nordic EU member states (Finland, Sweden and Denmark) plus the Nordic non-EU 
member states (Norway and Iceland) as well as Portugal, Spain and Austria might be willing to join the regional 
CPF.244 Important aspect to note, is that the participation of non-EU member states is not included in the count 
of nine member states.  
Other member states may be interested in joining the initiative, but since they have not publicly expressed their 
interest, a conclusion has to be drawn that currently there are not enough member states to back up a CPF 
through enhanced cooperation. 
It is easy to argue that the CPF cannot be construed by the EU as a whole within a reasonable time, as reducing 
GHG emissions gets harder every day; and if action is delayed, the needed measures will become more and 
more expensive.  
7.3 The area of cooperation must be outside the EU's exclusive competence  
The EU ETS falls into the category of shared competence. Energy and environment are sectors mentioned in 
Article 4 of the TFEU's non-exhaustive list of areas that are in the shared competence. The recital of the EU ETS 
Directive shows the basis of the Directive: “Having regard to The treaty establishing the European Community 
(TEC), and in particular Article 175(1)” and “acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of 
The treaty”.245 Article 175 of the TEC was Article that concerned environmental measures. Article 175 paragraph 
1 references Article 174, which provides a list of activities that are within the Community’s discretion relating 
to the environment.246 These activities include e.g. preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the 
environment and the prudent and rational utilization of natural resources. 
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In the case of carbon price floor, this entails that the rules are the same regardless of whether the carbon price 
floor would be considered to be a part of the EU's energy policy or whether it would be a part of environmental 
policy.  
7.4 Objectives, interests and the integration process of the EU  
The provision stating that the aim needs to be furthering the EU's objectives constitutes a requirement for the 
measure to be covered by a treaty area. Article 3 of the TEU lists the objectives of the EU as "a  high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment." This is spelled out more definitively  in the TFEU 
Articles 191 to 193, which cover environmental protection and explicitly indicate that member states are 
allowed to take further measures in this area.247 Therefore, the CPF should be in line with the EU's objectives. 
Furthermore, the same treaty article sets an obligation that the measure needs to protect the EU's interests and 
to reinforce the integration process. When the Commission was assessing the Rome 3 regulation -an already 
effectuated enhanced cooperation, it took an approach where in the absence of a consensus, at least some 
cooperation is better than no cooperation.248 This indeed could be argued, especially regarding heavier carbon 
pricing, since from a climate protecting view, which is one of the EU's goals, there is no difference where the 
mitigation is done. The UK's carbon price floor has led to a 90 per cent reduction in coal-fired power 
production.249 A regional CPF is more preferable option than a national CPF in terms of emission reductions and 
security of supply. A national carbon price floor would lead to lower domestic emissions over time, but higher 
overall emissions in the same region than a regional CPF.250 It can furthermore be argued that the member 
states might not be willing to implement these measures unilaterally, and, without a regional agreement, the 
carbon price floor would not be adapted as widely.251 Moreover, the ETS was implemented essentially on the 
same grounds as the CPF would likely be implemented.252  
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It is clear that the carbon price floor is in line with the objectives set out in the treaties. It can be argued that 
the form of the carbon price floor is not of significant importance in terms of the purpose; both the top-up tax 
and the minimum auction price aim for the same objective: putting a higher and more stable price on GHG 
emissions.  
It is unclear whether the regional carbon price floor would reinforce the integration process. The integration 
that happens under the auspices of EU framework is reinforcing integration at least more than alternative 
integration outside the EU framework.  
7.5 Enhanced cooperation as a last resort 
What does "adopted as a last resort, when the Council has established that the objectives cannot be attained 
within a reasonable period by the EU as a whole" entail for a carbon price floor?253 The TFEU does not specify 
that there has to be a proposal on the subject, and it has been argued that this criterion would be fulfilled in 
cases where one or more member states are explicitly against the measure.254 In the case of the Rome 3 
Regulation, the Commission published a Green Paper that included conflict of law rules and jurisdiction rules in 
international marriages. Many member states disapproved these rules and it was clear that the proposal would 
not reach unanimity.255 The Council officially acknowledged that it was impossible to reach an agreement within 
a reasonable time.256  
In the first challenge against the unitary patent in the ECJ, Italy and Spain argued that the discussion was not 
sufficient enough to be regarded as a "last resort".257 Claimants stated that the language arrangements had not 
been discussed thoroughly and that there was a real chance of compromise if negotiations would have 
continued. Although, Italy acknowledged the fact that the Council has a broad discretion in determining whether 
the negotiations are completed and there is certainty that the enhanced cooperation is adopted as a last 
resort.258 The Court's response to the plea was that since the proposal for an EU-wide unitary patent has been 
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around from the year 2000 and the proposal was discussed with every member state, the Council's decision is 
right. Furthermore, the Court argued that the Council is in the best position to define whether the condition of 
"last resort" is fulfilled.259 
If the carbon price floor would be adopted as a top-up tax, it is subject to unanimity in the Council, since it is, as 
argued supra, a provision primarily of a fiscal nature, mentioned in Article 192 of the TFEU. Unanimity is not 
likely to be achieved; hence certain member states are strongly opposed to this measure. For example, Poland 
and Greece are planning to increase their coal production, and a tax on the carbon content of fuel would 
contradict this aim by making electricity generation with coal a less attractive investment. Polish representatives 
have publicly talked negatively about the carbon price floor.260 It is not clear whether these statements opposing 
a carbon price floor will be sufficient for the enhanced cooperation to be considered a "last resort". The 
condition requiring that objectives cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the EU as a whole is closely 
linked to the last resort. However, there is a slight difference. It can be said that negative statements form a 
barrier to the achievement of these objectives within a reasonable period, but it still does not mean that it is 
necessarily a "last resort". As seen from the previously implemented enhanced cooperation legislation, there 
needs to be at least some form of discussion about the topic. In the earlier schemes there have been official 
discussions around the implementation of the scheme on the whole of the EU or the proposals have failed to 
get the required majority. Regarding the CPF, the European Commission proposed a Community-wide carbon 
tax in 1992. The proposed carbon tax somewhat resembled what the CPF would eventually look like, if it were  
to be implemented like the UK model. However, this tax on the carbon content of fuel used in electricity 
generation would have served a different purpose as the main instrument of the EU's climate policy. The 
minimum price, however, would be an integral part complementing the ETS. Therefore, it cannot be said that 
the same proposal as the CPF has been discussed Union-wide. If there is to be a legislative initiative on a regional 
CPF, the participating member states should note that in order to be certain that the proposal passes the 
criterion of last resort, the discussion of a Union-wide CPF should be held first. This is not, however, an 
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unconditional requirement for the proposal to pass. The Commission may deem the requirement fulfilled even 
with the current level of discussions.  
Price management measures such as a minimum price for the auctions, were considered in the Commission's 
report in 2012, which was followed by a public consultation. The stakeholders' attitudes towards discretionary 
price management measures were mainly negative. This kind of examination is certainly far from being adopted 
as a last resort.261 
7.6 Participation is open to all willing member states at any time 
Joining the enhanced cooperation later should not create any difficulties, because a tax can be easily 
implemented unilaterally. If the CPF is combined with the cancellation of allowances, there needs to be 
coordination with that.  
This requirement should not create a barrier to the minimum price in the auctions either. A higher share of 
allowances simply would be auctioned with a minimum price. If the regional minimum price is compatible with 
other requirements, its implementation should not depend on the market conditions, such as the proportion of 
allowances with a minimum price.  
7.7 The cooperation shall comply with EU treaties and laws 
The Lisbon Treaty embodied the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of proportionality into primary 
legislation. The core idea of the subsidiarity principle is that EU should only exercise its legislative powers when 
the goal can be better achieved at the EU level. According to principle of proportionality, the content and form 
of the EU's action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the EU's treaties.262 It is clear 
that the EU's aim to cut GHG emissions by 80 to 95 per cent requires more stringent measures by the member 
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states. The CPF is in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity; hence it is better to regulate it EU-wide or at 
least regionally rather than solely by member states.263  
Furthermore, compliance with EU treaties and laws should not present a problem, if the CPF were to  be 
implemented in a manner similar to the UK's national CPF. Hence compatibility with the EU legislation has not 
raised any concerns, and the Commission has approved the UK's state aid measure related to the CPF. Moreover, 
there are currently no Union-wide harmonized taxes covering the carbon content of fuel used for electricity 
generation.  
Whether the regional minimum price would be compatible with the treaties largely depends on the 
implementation of the price floor. The analysis for the compatibility under enhanced cooperation is similar to 
the analysis for the application of Article 193. A definitive answer cannot be given, but the minimum price is 
more likely to be compatible with the treaties if it is not accompanied by restrictions to the movement of the 
allowances. As mentioned supra, the requirement to purchase allowances solely from the auctions of certain 
member states could be in breach of the free movement of goods or free movement of capital, depending how 
EUA is defined.264 On the other hand, restrictions are required in order to prevent the minimum price from 
affecting the non-participating member states. If the flow of EUAs is left uncoordinated, the demand for 
allowances auctioned without a minimum price will spike. As the ECJ stated in the Polish MSR plea, the 
measure's compatibility is to be studied against the actual effect of the measure.265  
The minimum price is not likely compatible with the treaties, as it directly affects the market conditions in all of 
the member states. 
7.8 Internal market or economic, social and territorial cohesion 
The cooperation shall not undermine the internal market or economic, social and territorial cohesion. It shall 
not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between member states, nor shall it distort competition 
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between them. The top-up tax would have a direct effect on the electricity generators operating in the 
participating country. The price of non-renewable energy would increase in these countries. The effect on non-
participating countries would not be as straightforward. They could still sell their electricity to the participating 
state's markets and, in fact, their non-renewable electricity would actually be more competitive, because it 
would not be subject to the tax. Consequently, the top-up tax should be compatible with the requirements 
concerning the internal market. The top-up tax would certainly increase electricity prices in the participating 
member states. The requirement relating to economic, social and territorial cohesion would depend on the 
details of the legislation and requires a further study on the abovementioned impacts.  
Regarding the regional minimum price, problems rise when it is only implemented in some member states. The 
implementation depends on the possible restrictions to the free movement of allowances. It is vital to note the 
fact that the effect is distinctly different depending on which member states participate in it. The participation 
of Germany, especially, is crucial, as its economy is still largely powered by lignite and hard coal, and as it is the 
largest market in the EU. Electricity production in Germany has a large impact on the EUA price.266 
7.9 The competences, rights and obligations of non-participating member states  
The regional top-up tax does not constitute any barriers to the internal market and, actually, it only enhances 
the competitive standpoint of non-participating countries, at least in the short term. It is a different equation if 
the CPF would be accompanied by an allowance cancellation measure. The introduction of a CPF would increase 
the price of fossil-fuel powered electricity, which would lead to a reduction in demand. The reduced demand 
for high carbon content electricity leads to a reduced demand for EUAs. If the number of allowances is not 
reduced correspondingly, there will be excess supply that will drag the EUA price down. If the participating 
member states do adjust the supply by cancelling a corresponding amount of allowances that the CPF is reducing 
the demand for, the overall cap of the EU ETS will be tightened by more than what was agreed at the EU level. 
If the supply is reduced by the correct amount, it should not have any impact on the EUA price. As neither the 
price of an allowance or the rules of free allocation would be affected by the top-up tax in non-participating 
MSs, it would not create a major change to the status quo. The size of the EUA market would be scaled down. 
                                                           





The regional top-up tax is hard to be viewed as violating competences, rights or obligations. Affecting the energy 
market does not necessarily entail affecting the rights, competences or obligations of member states. However, 
affecting the energy market could affect these conditions if it changes "the conditions for exploiting its energy 
resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply."267 
Regarding the minimum price, the same concerns arise again, and the effect depends largely on how it is 
implemented and which member states take part in it. The legality of the measure cannot depend on market 
conditions. As the regional minimum price generally can have a disproportionate effect on other MSs the answer 
should be restrictive.  
7.10 Participating member states' request to the Commission  
The participating member states need to submit their proposal to the Commission, which may propose it to the 
Council. The treaty does not explain what "may" means in this context. This wording leaves substantial amount 
of consideration for the Commission. In fact, the Commission did not respond to the proposed enhanced 
cooperation on the Rome 3 Regulation for almost two years and only after the new Commission was appointed 
was the proposal submitted to the Council.268 The Commission has not refused to submit an enhanced 
cooperation proposal yet, and what the grounds for refusal are remains to be seen.  
7.11 Participating member states' unanimous decision in the Council and European 
Parliament's consent 
After the Commission has submitted the proposal to the Council and the Parliament has given its consent, the 
final decision can be made in the Council. The decision is made by participating member states; however, non-
participating states can participate in the discussions without having a vote.269  
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The Parliament's consent is governed by the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, according to Rule 
99 (4) "Parliament shall decide on the proposed act by means of a single vote on consent." 
The decision making in the Council is done according to the procedure laid out in Article 329 and 330. Only 
participating Member states can take part in the vote. Furthermore, the article defines the contextual meaning 
of unanimity and qualified majority. However, there is no specification about when the unanimity requirement 
is applicable. The only explicitly mentioned application of the unanimity requirement is regarding the framework 
of the common foreign and security policy. The article does not answer the question of would a measure 
requiring unanimity when it is implemented EU-wide require unanimity when it is implanted via enhanced 
cooperation. By negation, one can infer that since unanimity is explicitly mentioned only in relation to common 
foreign and security policy, voting by qualified majority will be utilized in other procedures.270 This question does 
not have significant practical importance, since it can be assumed that the countries participating in the 
enhanced cooperation will vote in favour of it in the Council, and, because only participating member states 
have the right to vote, the decisions should be accepted unanimously by custom.   
7.12 Viability of enhanced cooperation 
As the analysis above shows, the feasibility of a regional carbon price floor implemented via enhanced 
cooperation is uncertain. The regional minimum price would have a greater impact on the overall EUA market 
and non-participating member states than a regional top-up tax would have. Therefore, it is less likely to be 
feasible. The fact that both the Commission and the EP have to give their approval for enhanced cooperation 
creates uncertainty. As the inherent nature of these institutions is to promote supranational interests and to 
promote EU integration as a whole, it is not self-evident that they will be keen on promoting enhanced 
cooperation.271 However, from an institutional point of view, it would be better to integrate deeper within The 
treaty framework and preserve the role of the EU institutions, rather than agree outside The treaty boundaries.  
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D Concluding remarks 
9 Conclusions 
To limit global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius or even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius, the ambition 
level of GHG mitigation must be significantly raised. There are various ways to reach the targets. A recent IPCC 
report showed that limiting the warming to 1.5 means that global GHG emissions need to be net-zero in 2050, 
which most likely requires negative emissions by, for example, removing carbon dioxide from the air or flue 
gases. Relying on negative emissions is not advisable since the viability of these technologies on a large scale is 
uncertain. Practically every nation needs to increase its ambition to be compatible with the Paris Agreement. 
This applies to the EU as well. As a climate policy forerunner, the EU should take the lead and set a target of 
reaching net-zero emissions by 2050. Many member states recognize this and try to push for a more ambitious 
climate policy nationally and within the EU framework.  
The continued low price in the EU ETS during 2008-2017 has raised calls for additional strengthening of the 
system by adjusting the existing ETS parameters or by using discretionary price management mechanisms like 
a carbon price floor. A carbon price floor could, in principle, be implemented either as a top-up tax or as an 
auction reserve price.  
In the EU context, law cannot often be distinguished from political context. In EU, law is closely linked to the 
politics, these two are especially close as the Euro crisis proves, even the founding treaties bend if the political 
will is strong enough. The close relation of law and politics actualizes in less extreme way e.g. when the correct 
legislative process is assessed in the EU and terms such as "a significant impact on the Member states' energy 
choices between different energy sources" are interpreted. Phrases such as the above mentioned are open for 
interpretation and policy arguments. Therefore, the legal procedure is not detached from the underlying 
political situation and interpretation ultimately requires some value choices.   
Some form of a carbon price floor is already in place in a few other ETSs. This thesis analysed the UK's model of 
tax topping up the EUA price and California's model providing a minimum price in the auctions. The EU has a 





TFEU. From a judicial perspective, the most interesting question regarding the implementation of a carbon price 
floor is what legislative procedure is to be applied. The TFEU Article 192 (2) requires a unanimous decision in 
the Council for provisions primarily of a fiscal nature and measures significantly affecting a member state's 
choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. The top-up tax is clearly 
a fiscal measure, which requires unanimity in the Council. Reaching unanimity on an issue as sensitive as higher 
GHG emission pricing is currently unthinkable. For member states relying heavily on coal-based electricity 
generation, a higher price on GHG emissions is unacceptable. In the event that unanimity would be reached, 
the top-up tax would require a totally new Directive or a new regulation in the EU, as it is explicitly outside the 
scope of ETS Directive and the Auctioning Regulation. 
The first research question was, what is the correct legislative procedure for implementing an EU-wide carbon 
price floor? Defining the correct procedure for the WCI's and the RGGI's auction reserve price, which acts as a 
minimum price in the auctions, is more complicated. Finding the correct legal procedure requires analysing the 
significance of the impact that it has on the member state's ability to choose between different energy sources 
and an analysis on whether it constitutes a primarily fiscal measure. Previous EU case law shows that there is a 
high threshold for the impact to be considered as significant. In the MSR case the ECJ interpreted the MSR as a 
necessary reform for the market to function properly and therefore not as exceeding the threshold for 
significance. The ECJ's case regarding the inclusion of aviation and the challenge of the legislative basis of 
California's ETS both confirm that the ETS does not constitute a tax. As shown in previous case law, there is a 
strong argument that the minimum price can be implemented in ordinary legislative procedure implicating a 
decision by a qualified majority in the EC. The minimum price could be implemented as an EU-wide instrument 
by amending the ETS Directive and the Auctioning Regulation. If the EU were to choose this option and 
implement a minimum price via qualified majority decision, it would likely be challenged in the ECJ. Ultimately, 
the correct procedure will depend on how the ECJ interprets the TFEU Article 192 in the possible judicial review. 
Concerns about the unanimity requirement in the Council have raised proposals of a regional carbon price floor. 
In an interconnected market a regional carbon price floor would be more effective than a national CPF for 
phasing out coal and it might prevent imports of fossil fuel-powered electricity from neighbouring states. If the 
carbon price floor were implemented only in countries that are in favour of the CPF, it could be implemented 





The proposals on a carbon price floor by a few member states and related background analyses and studies 
have so far dealt mostly with technical and economic aspects and their impact on the power and carbon 
markets. However, they have lacked substantiality on the governance and legal form of the regional CPF. This 
thesis analysed both implementing the CPF outside of the EU legal framework and implementing it within the 
EU using enhanced cooperation provided in the TEU Article 20.   
The second research question was, can the carbon price floor be implemented regionally and what are the 
boundaries from EU legislation’s perspective? The member states would certainly be able to agree on the UK-
model top-up tax outside the EU legislative framework. A Carbon price support rate is possible among two or 
more member states, as taxation affects only domestic entities. An agreement between member states on the 
top-up tax would most likely be an MoU. Using an MoU does not provide any guarantee that the other parties 
will comply with the agreement nor does it guarantee longer-term predictability of the arrangement. Even if the 
member states would use a traditional hard law treaty, withdrawing from the arrangement would not be 
difficult. The stability of the arrangement is hard to guarantee outside of the EU legislative framework.  
The third research question was, can the carbon price floor be implemented by using enhanced cooperation? 
The viability of a regional top-up tax is uncertain, if it is implemented via enhanced cooperation. Enhanced 
cooperation requires a minimum of nine member states. Currently only France is explicitly supporting a regional 
carbon price floor, the UK has its own national CPF, and the Netherlands is planning to introduce a similar 
national instrument. There is no clarity on the position of the other member states. It is unclear when the 
requirement that enhanced cooperation is adopted as a last resort is fulfilled. As there have been no official 
proposals on adopting a CPF at the EU-level the requirement for enhanced cooperation to be adopted as a last 
resort is certainly not fulfilled yet. The fact that both the Commission and the European Parliament have to give 
their approval for the enhanced cooperation creates ambiguity. As the inherent nature of these institutions is 
to promote supranational interests and to promote EU integration as a whole, it is not self-evident that they 
will be keen on supporting enhanced cooperation. However, from an institutional point of view, it would make 
sense to integrate deeper within the treaty framework and, consequently, preserve the role of the EU 
institutions. The enhanced cooperation has been utilized only a few times and the ECJ has laid down the criteria 





towards the proposal: if it favours the idea it is more likely to find the proposal compatible with the 
requirements and submit the proposal to the EP and the EC. 
The regional minimum price cannot be implemented in the EU legislative framework or via an 
intergovernmental agreement. Auction reserve price cannot be implemented regionally, as the EU has 
harmonized auctioning rules and an auction reserve price would hamper the internal market and affect the free 
movement of goods and the free movement of capital. A single member state imposing a higher price on its 
share of auctioned allowances would affect the market and be in contradiction with the harmonizing aim of the 
auctioning regulation and the ETS Directive. This measure would directly increase the average allowance price. 
To avoid the higher prices in non-participating member states, the movement of allowances would have to be 
restricted; this measure would contradict the aims of ETS legislation as well by fragmenting the market.   
Interesting topics for further research would be the top-up tax's compatibility with the national constitutions 
and its compatibility with the Energy Charter Treaty or investment treaties in general. These considerations are 
more likely relevant, if the CPF were implemented as a tax. As showed in this study, the top-up tax is an 
instrument outside the existing legislative framework and therefore it might revoke the application of these 
requirements, whereas the minimum price would be a modification of an already existing system and therefore 
it is less prone to national constitution restrictions or to infringe on an investment treaty.  
The state aid aspect should be addressed, if new environmental state aid guidelines change the rules for 
providing state aid. Under current rules, the UK state aid for the increased electricity cost caused by the CPF is 
approved by the Commission. The UK's state aid for the CPF is approved by the same rules as the state aid for 
the EUA price. Furthermore, because the minimum price would be an integral part of the EUA price, the state 
aid issue does not need to be considered separately. 
The carbon price floor is possible, but is it desirable? This is not self-evident. The EU ETS has already witnessed 
how overlapping policies can ruin the proper functioning of the ETS. The Energy Efficiency Directive, the RES 
Directive and national measures have reduced the demand for EUAs, creating an oversupply. The introduction 
of the CPF might cause a similar waterbed effect whereby the introduction of one policy instrument makes 
another instrument less effective. To avoid this, the preferable option for increasing the price level would be to 
change the LRF and forget discretionary price management measures. The tightened cap combined with the 





accompanied by legal uncertainties, it may cause a waterbed effect, and is not as cost-efficient as a fully market-
based system. If policymakers were to resort to CPF, an EU-wide minimum price would be least distortive from 
a market point of view and, administratively, the easiest option. Generally, regional instruments should be 
avoided.  
 
